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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the face of limited federal action to address climate change, states 
have attempted to fill the gap by creating new energy policies designed to 
promote renewable electricity generation, place limits on greenhouse gas 
emissions, and encourage the use of low-carbon fuels. In doing so, 
however, states necessarily influence regional and national energy markets, 
leading to challenges that they are discriminating against out-of-state 
interests and improperly interfering with interstate markets in violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause. While Commerce Clause challenges to 
environmental protection initiatives are nothing new, the recent Commerce 
Clause challenges to state clean energy policies are in some ways the mirror 
image of the Commerce Clause challenges to federal environmental policies 
of the last twenty years. The bulk of Commerce Clause challenges in the 
environmental law arena over the past few decades have been challenges 
to Congress’s authority to legislate on a federal level, based on whether the 
subject of regulation—such as species protection, wetland regulation, or 
control of hazardous waste—was sufficiently connected to interstate 
commerce. Today, by contrast, it is the states that are creating new laws to 
reduce waste, promote renewable energy, reduce air pollution, and address 
climate change, which necessarily affect regional, national, and sometimes 
even international energy structures and markets. Thus, the complaint by 
plaintiffs in these cases is that the state’s efforts are too connected to 
interstate commerce and thus exceed the state’s authority to regulate. 
This Article will focus specifically on potential challenges to state 
energy policy based on the “extraterritoriality doctrine” of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. In doing so, it considers two recent lawsuits involving 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state energy policy. The first is 
the lawsuit against the State of California over its Low Carbon Fuels 
Standard (LCFS) program on grounds that it discriminates against Midwest 
ethanol producers in favor of California ethanol producers and regulates 
extraterritorially in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The 
second is the lawsuit by the State of North Dakota, the North Dakota 
lignite coal industry, and regional electric cooperatives against the State 
of Minnesota over provisions of its Next Generation Energy Act (NGEA). 
The NGEA prohibits new coal-fired electricity generation in the state and 
prohibits imports of new coal-fired generation from outside the state without 
accompanying CO2 offsets. In that case the plaintiffs allege, among other 
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things, that the law discriminates against out-of-state coal interests 
and regulates extraterritorially in violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. This Article will discuss both of the cases in detail to highlight the 
potential challenges associated with state efforts to use energy policy to 
address climate change, and to suggest how to place those cases in today’s 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
In both the California and Minnesota cases, plaintiffs allege that by 
attempting to influence interstate markets for fuels and electricity the 
states are attempting to control commerce beyond their borders. Such an 
argument raises critical concerns for state energy policy. Today’s energy 
markets are interstate and interconnected, with fuels and electricity 
flowing in regional, national, and international markets  rather than 
intrastate, local markets. Likewise climate change, unlike traditional forms of 
air pollution, is a regional, national, and international issue, with no one 
state or even one nation able to limit climate change solely through its 
own policies. But does that mean a state cannot use its own energy policy 
to influence the carbon intensity of the fuels and electricity used within its 
state borders because that policy might influence decisions outside the 
state? This article concludes that the answer to that question is “no,” and 
explores why state authority to use energy policy to address climate 
change is consistent with principles of federalism and should not be 
blocked by arguments that such legislation violates the extraterritoriality 
doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause. In general, if states choose to 
encourage more energy efficient behavior by transportation fuel providers or 
electricity importers who wish to participate in state  retail energy 
markets, the dormant Commerce Clause should be no more a barrier to 
those choices than the hundreds of other health, safety, and environmental 
protection laws that influence companies selling light bulbs, appliances, 
and other products in interstate markets. Congress could create more 
uniformity in that regard by affirmatively preempting state law, as it has 
done with auto emissions and appliance efficiency standards, in some 
circumstances. But in the absence of federal preemption, dormant 
Commerce Clause precedent should not be used to create new barriers to 
energy markets where it has not done so in other commercial markets. 
This Article ultimately argues that courts should eliminate or significantly 
limit the use of the extraterritoriality doctrine as a separate branch of 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in most circumstances or, in the 
alternative, limit its application to situations where there are significant 
concerns that states are exceeding their authority in a manner that favors 
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in-state interests over out-of-state interests or interferes with a strong 
federal policy favoring uniformity in that regulatory arena. 
Part II provides background on the dormant Commerce Clause and the 
key Supreme Court and lower court cases that set the stage for analyzing 
Commerce Clause challenges to state energy policy. It focuses specifically 
on dormant Commerce Clause cases involving state energy and 
environmental policy as well as cases addressing the extraterritoriality 
doctrine. In doing so, it explores the tensions inherent in efforts by states 
to promote public health, safety, and environmental protection, which are 
legitimate state interests, when those policies necessarily affect the 
economic interests of out-of-state actors who wish to participate in state 
and interstate markets for fuels and electricity generation. 
Part III introduces the potential challenges the dormant Commerce Clause 
poses to state energy policy in light of a variety of lawsuits that have been 
brought around the country to state efforts to promote renewable fuels and 
electricity through renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, renewable 
fuel requirements, and limits on new coal-fired power plants. It then focuses 
specifically on the California LCFS lawsuit and the Minnesota NGEA 
lawsuit to explore how plaintiffs are using the extraterritoriality doctrine 
of the dormant Commerce Clause to limit state efforts to use energy policy 
to address climate change and other environmental policy goals. 
Part IV considers what lessons can be learned from the dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges to the California and Minnesota laws with 
a specific focus on the relationship between these laws and interstate 
markets for fuels and electricity. Putting aside the hotly contested issue in 
both cases of whether the laws discriminate against out-of-state interests in 
favor of in-state interests, the fact remains that, like much state regulation, 
these laws impact interstate markets for goods and services, specifically, 
energy goods and services. Plaintiffs in the two cases use this fact to argue 
that the laws impermissibly control out-of-state activities and interfere 
with interstate markets in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. But to 
accept this argument would require courts to severely limit state energy 
policies to address climate change and to meet other legitimate state policy 
goals despite the fact that federal law gives states broad authority to regulate 
the use of fuels, electricity, and other energy sources within state borders. 
Certainly, Congress has authority to regulate these issues on a national 
basis and may preempt state action in these areas. But the existence of this 
federal authority should not, on its own, eliminate a state’s authority to set 
state energy policy even if such actions may influence decisions made by out-
of-state companies to participate in those state markets. While the state 
may not meet those goals by discriminating against out-of-state economic 
interests, the fact that state policy may influence actions  of both in-
state and out-of-state interests that wish to participate in the state’s energy 
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markets need not automatically run afoul of the dormant Commerce 
Clause based on the extraterritoriality doctrine. 
II.  THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the 
power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.”1 The 
Supreme Court has also interpreted this clause to include a negative, or 
“dormant,” provision that restricts states from engaging in economic 
protectionist behavior that discriminates against or burdens interstate 
commerce.2 
The first question in any dormant Commerce Clause challenge is whether 
the state law discriminates against interstate commerce. A state law 
discriminates against interstate commerce if it is facially discriminatory, has 
a discriminatory purpose, or is discriminatory in effect.3 If a court 
determines that a state law discriminates against interstate commerce 
based on point of origin or other geographic factors, it will apply strict 
scrutiny and invalidate the law unless the state can show that the law 
protects a legitimate state interest and that the law is the only reasonable 
means of protecting that interest.4 State laws that discriminate include 
those that block imports, tax out-of-state goods but not in-state goods, or 
otherwise give facial preference or have a purpose or effect of giving 
preference to in-state resources or goods at the expense of out-of-state 
resources or goods.5 Local laws, in addition to state laws, can violate the 
 
 1.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 2.  New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988); Baldwin v. 
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). Because the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine is based on Congress’s power to regulate commerce, Congress may by statute 
exempt state laws from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. 
v. Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 373 & n.19–20 (1994). 
 3.  See Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 
ENVTL. L. 295, 300–02 (2013). 
 4.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); Maine 
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986); City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 
(1978). 
 5.  See CAROLYN ELEFANT & EDWARD A. HOLT, CLEAN ENERGY ALLIANCE, THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE IMPLICATION FOR STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD 
PROGRAMS 5–7 (2011); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 
504 U.S. 353, 367 (1992) (holding that a state regulation providing that solid waste 
generated outside the county could not be accepted for disposal without authorization from 
the receiving county was facially discriminatory); New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 279–80 
KLASS-HENLEY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:24 AM 
 
132 
dormant Commerce Clause. For instance, in the often-cited case of Dean 
Milk v. Madison,6 the Supreme Court invalidated a local ordinance that 
required all milk sold in the City of Madison, Wisconsin to be pasteurized 
within five miles of the city limits on grounds that it was “erecting an 
economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition” 
from outside the state.7 
By contrast, if a court determines that a state law is facially neutral and 
there is no evidence of discriminatory purpose or effect, it will apply a 
flexible balancing test, known at the “Pike balancing test,” (after the case 
of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.) that considers whether the burdens imposed 
on interstate commerce are “clearly excessive” in relation to the local 
benefits.8 Courts almost always invalidate state laws that are found to be 
discriminatory and are thus subject to strict scrutiny but often uphold state 
laws that are not discriminatory but nevertheless burden interstate 
commerce and are thus subject to the Pike balancing test.9 There are also 
 
(finding Ohio’s income tax credit limited to in-state ethanol producers to be facially 
discriminatory); City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624, 628 (1978) (holding that 
a New Jersey ban on out-of-state garbage was discriminatory against out-of-state resources 
and thus “virtually per se invalid.”); W. Lynn Creamery Co. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) 
(holding that a tax on all milk sales coupled with a subsidy for in-state milk production 
discriminated against interstate commerce and was invalid). 
 6.  340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
 7.  Id. at 354. It was no defense that the ordinance also applied to milk producers 
within the State of Wisconsin outside the five-mile limit. Id. at 354, n.4. 
 8.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 9.  Compare Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 
(1994) (finding per se discrimination in case of state law that imposed a higher surcharge 
on foreign waste brought into the state for disposal than for domestic waste); C & A 
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390, 392–93 (1994) (local ordinance requiring that solid waste 
handled within town borders be brought to town’s transfer station was facially 
discriminatory and per se invalid); W. Lynn Creamery Co., 512 U.S. 186 (holding that a 
tax on all milk sales coupled with a subsidy for in-state milk production resulted in 
discrimination against out-of-state milk producers and was invalid); Healy v. Beer Inst., 
491 U.S. 324 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny), with United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (holding county flow control 
ordinance directing both in-state and out-of-state waste to county-owned recycling facility 
did not discriminate against out of state interests and that the  benefits of increasing 
recycling to promote health and safety in the county outweighed any burden on interstate 
commerce under the Pike balancing test); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429 (2005) (finding flat fee  of $100 on trucks engaged in 
intrastate commercial hauling regulated evenhandedly to all carriers making domestic 
journeys and thus did not violate the Commerce Clause). But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 
U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (upholding Maine statute prohibiting imported baitfish even though 
it facially discriminated against interstate commerce because the state established it had 
no other reasonable alternative means to protect its aquatic ecosystem and the state had 
“authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural 
resources.”); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 
U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (recognizing that “that there is no clear line separating the category 
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some defenses states can rely on to avoid Commerce Clause 
challenges beyond attempting to rebut claims of facial discrimination or 
discriminatory effect. These include the “market participant” defense, which 
permits a state to discriminate against interstate commerce when the state is 
participating in the market itself by selling or purchasing goods or favoring a 
state-owned entity rather than merely regulating the market.10 
Beyond the determination of whether a state law discriminates against 
interstate commerce, courts also consider as part of the dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis whether a state law reaches beyond its jurisdiction and 
attempts to control conduct outside the state’s borders. Under this 
“extraterritoriality principle,” a state law that is not facially discriminatory 
may still be invalid under a strict scrutiny test if it has the “practical effect” 
of regulating commerce outside the state’s borders, or effectively 
“controls the conduct of those engaged in commerce occurring wholly 
outside the State.”11 A related concern that arises in these cases is that 
inconsistent state laws regulating out-of-state behavior may impose 
conflicting obligations on participants in interstate markets.12 
 
of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the 
category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach.”). 
 10.  See United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 334; Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 
U.S. 794, 806 (1976). See also Lee & Duane, supra note 3, at 300–12. 
 11.  See generally Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much—An 
Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 78 (1981) 
(“When a state statute burdens both domestic and foreign producers, in-state interests 
typically can be expected to safeguard this concern. By contrast, when . . . the challenged 
regulation disadvantages only the out-of-state producers, this ‘internal political check’ is 
absent. Thus, adherents to this theory conclude that such regulations should be subject to 
stricter judicial scrutiny.”); ERIN PARLAR, MICHAEL BABAKITIS, & SHELLEY WELTON, 
LEGAL ISSUES IN REGULATING IMPORTS IN STATE AND REGIONAL CAP AND TRADE 
PROGRAMS 20–21 (Columbia Ctr. for Climate Change ed. 2012); Hunt v. Wash. State 
Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350, 353 (1977) (finding state statute prohibiting 
individual state grading designs on closed apple containers, and permitting only the U.S. 
grading system or no system at all, had the practical effect of burdening interstate sales 
and discriminating against Washington apples); Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 337–38 (Connecticut 
statute requiring alcohol wholesalers to ensure their prices were no higher than those in 
neighboring states had the practical effect of discriminating against interstate commerce 
and extraterritorially regulated out-of-state markets); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 
359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (finding statute requiring use of contoured mudguards in Illinois, 
while almost all other states required a different type of mudguard, had the practical effect of 
impermissibly burdening interstate markets). 
 12.  See, e.g., Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 337 (finding statute’s extraterritorial regulatory 
effect was likely to create inconsistent legislation); Michael J. Ruttinger, Is There a 
Dormant Extraterritoriality Principle? Commerce Clause Limits on State Antitrust Laws, 
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Yet neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts have established with 
any real clarity when effects felt beyond the borders of the regulating state 
amount to impermissible extraterritorial legislation.13 The following sections 
explore the trajectory of dormant Commerce Clause cases in the context 
of (1) challenges to state laws attempting to promote sustainable energy 
policy and environmental protection goals, and (2) allegations of 
extraterritorial regulation. As states make additional efforts to protect the 
environment through innovative energy policy measures, they necessarily 
impact interstate energy markets for fuels and electricity. As a result, the 
cases discussed below help determine the potential limits on those efforts as 
well as insight as to how courts have addressed these contemporary 




106 MICH. L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2007) (advocating an alternative “Inconsistency Principle” to 
clarify when the extraterritoriality principle will implicate dormant Commerce Clause 
scrutiny; namely, when regulations impose inconsistent obligations on an out-of-state 
defendant). 
 13.  See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 789 (2001) (stating that the extraterritoriality aspects of 
the dormant Commerce Clause “are unsettled and poorly understood”); Katherine J. 
Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality 
Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1060, 1068 
(2009) (“[W]e know that ‘[f]or the most part, states may not legislate extraterritorially, 
whatever exactly that means.’. . . [T]he Supreme Court has not developed a uniform 
standard for assessing the proper scope of state legislative jurisdiction.” (internal citations 
omitted)). Compare Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336–37 (finding statute that had impacts 
“wholly outside the State’s borders” impermissibly imposed Connecticut’s law 
extraterritorially), and Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor 
Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 581–82 (1986) (New York statute prohibiting distillers from 
making sales anywhere in the United States at prices lower than prices in New York 
impermissibly “forc[ed] a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one state before 
undertaking a transaction in another” and “directly regulate[d] interstate commerce”), with 
Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2011), 
cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 22 (2012) (No. 10-1555) (California’s restrictive vessel fuel use 
rules were valid exercises of the state’s police power in response to the “severe 
environmental problems confronting California” and did not regulate extraterritorially); 
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 647 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding Ohio statute 
regulating milk labeling did not require labelers to apply Ohio law to their labeling 
practices in states other than Ohio, and thus did not extraterritorially regulate “to impede 
or control the flow of milk products across the country.”). 
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A.  Energy and Environmental Cases Under the Dormant                      
Commerce Clause 
Examples of discriminatory laws involving environmental and energy 
policy include laws prohibiting hydroelectric power plants from selling 
power out-of-state, laws requiring power plants to burn a particular 
percentage of in-state coal, laws requiring all solid waste generated in a 
town to pass through a local processing center, laws imposing a hazardous 
waste disposal fee only on hazardous waste generated outside the state, or 
tax credits to users of in-state renewable fuels.14 Other state laws that do 
not discriminate may still violate the dormant Commerce Clause under the 
Pike balancing test if the burden imposed on interstate commerce is 
“clearly excessive” in relation to the local benefits.15 Local benefits such 
as energy conservation or protecting environmental health or safety can 
justify a burden on interstate commerce, but efforts to subsidize in-state 
industries generally cannot.16 
For instance, in 1982, in New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire,17 the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New Hampshire law that prohibited the 
export of hydroelectric power produced by a federally-licensed facility in the 
state. The Court stated that the issue in the case was “whether a state can 
 
 14.  See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) 
(local ordinance requiring solid waste to be processed at town’s transfer station was per se 
invalid); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988) (Ohio income tax 
credit for ethanol produced in-state was facially discriminatory, resulting in “favorable tax 
treatment for Ohio-produced ethanol” only); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 
455 U.S. 331, 341–44 (1982) (finding New Hampshire public utility order requiring 
hydroelectric power company to sell power only to in-state consumers facially restricted 
the flow of interstate commerce); Oklahoma v. Wyoming, 502 U.S. 437, 455–57 (1992) 
(Oklahoma statute requiring Oklahoma coal-fired electric generating plants producing 
power for in-state sale or use to burn a minimum of 10% Oklahoma-mined coal was 
facially discriminatory); ELEFANT & HOLT, supra note 5, at 5–6 (discussing cases). See 
also Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating in dicta 
that “Michigan’s first argument—that its law forbids it to credit wind power from out of 
state against the state’s required use of renewable energy by its utilities—trips over an 
insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the 
commerce clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state 
renewable energy.”). 
 15.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 16.  See ELEFANT & HOLT, supra note 5, at 7–8 (citing cases); Christine A. Klein, 
The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (noting that 
the Supreme Court has been skeptical of environmental justifications for state laws subject to 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges). 
 17.  455 U.S. 331 (1982). 
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constitutionally prohibit the exportation of hydroelectric energy produced 
within its borders by a federally-licensed facility, or otherwise reserve for 
its own citizens the ‘economic benefit’ of such hydroelectric power.”18 In 
holding that New Hampshire could not do so, the Court also noted that 
New Hampshire could not terminate its out-of-state transmission of 
hydroelectricity “without substantial alterations in the regional 
transmission systems to which its hydroelectric facilities are connected.”19 
Likewise, in 1988, in New Energy Co. v. Limbach, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a state tax credit to promote in-state renewable fuels.20 An 
Ohio law awarded a tax credit for each gallon of ethanol sold as a 
component of gasohol by fuel dealers only for ethanol produced in Ohio 
or, if the ethanol was produced in another state, if that state provided 
similar tax benefits to ethanol produced in Ohio.21 The Court rejected the 
argument that the Ohio law did not discriminate but instead simply 
encouraged other states to grant similar tax benefits, which would spur the 
interstate sale of ethanol.22 Relying on prior case law, the Court 
reasoned that such laws, rather than promoting free trade among the 
states, are a “threat of economic isolation” to force other states to enter 
into reciprocity agreements, and are thus subject to strict scrutiny under 
the dormant Commerce Clause.23 The Court also rejected the argument 
that any discrimination was justified because the purpose of the law was 
to encourage the use of ethanol, which would reduce harmful exhaust 
emissions, thus promoting a legitimate health and safety goal.24 The Court 
acknowledged the ability of the states to regulate to protect health and 
safety, and that the use of ethanol generally furthers that goal, but it found 
no reason to believe ethanol produced in Ohio was any healthier than 
ethanol produced in other states.25  In sum, the Court found that the law 
was facially discriminatory, that Ohio’s subsidy for in-state producers of 
ethanol was not specifically tailored to protect public health, and 
concluded that any health benefit achieved pursuant to the statute was 
“merely an occasional and accidental effect of achieving what is its purpose, 
favorable tax treatment for Ohio-produced ethanol.”26 
Finally, the Court has historically invalidated most state laws that prohibit 
the import or export of solid or hazardous waste on alleged public health 
 
 18.  New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 333. 
 19.  Id. at 343 n.10. 
 20.  New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279–80 (1988). 
 21.  New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 271. 
 22.  Id. at 275–77. 
 23.  Id. at 274–75. 
 24.  Id. at 279–80. 
 25.  Id. at 279. 
 26.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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and environmental protection grounds.27 In Philadelphia v. New Jersey,28 
Oregon Waste Disposal Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental 
Quality,29 and Fort Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of 
Natural Resources,30 the Court rejected various arguments that banning 
the disposal of out-of-state waste would protect public health, safety, or the 
environment. In each of these cases, along with similar cases where states 
imposed higher surcharges on the disposal of out-of-state waste,31 the 
Court found no reason to differentiate between in-state waste and out-of-
state waste for purposes of protecting public health and the 
environment. 
Until recently, laws banning the export of waste in favor of processing 
or recycling at local facilities (often referred to as “flow control laws”) 
such as the one at issue in C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkston,32 met a 
similar fate, with the Court holding that such laws merely protect the in-
state waste processing industry from out-of-state competition.33 In 2007, 
however, the Court refined that analysis somewhat in United Haulers 
Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, and found 
that so long as a county flow control law directed waste to a public facility 
for processing, the law was not discriminatory on its face because it treated 
private industry within the jurisdiction and outside the jurisdiction equally, 
 
 27.  See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978); C & A Carbone v. 
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (“States and localities may not attach restrictions to 
exports or imports in order to control commerce in other States.”). 
 28.  437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978) (“[I]t does not matter whether the ultimate aim of 
ch. 363 is to reduce the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to save remaining 
open lands from pollution . . . whatever New Jersey’s ultimate purpose, it may not be 
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State 
unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”). 
 29.  511 U.S. 93, 107 (1994) (“Even assuming that landfill space is a ‘natural 
resource,’ ‘a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over 
consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders.’”) (citing 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627). 
 30.  504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992) (finding statute prohibiting out-of-state generated 
waste from being processed absent an affirmative plan by the processing county did not 
involve an issue of hazardous waste, and no claim was made regarding health and safety). 
 31.  Or. Waste Disposal Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 107 (finding Oregon’s statute 
imposing a higher surcharge on out-of-state generated waste was not invulnerable to 
Commerce Clause challenge despite the state’s argument that the goal of the statute was 
“resource protectionism” rather than economic protectionism). 
 32.  C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. 383. 
 33.  Id. at 392–93. 
KLASS-HENLEY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:24 AM 
 
138 
resulting in no facial discrimination against interstate commerce.34 Once 
there was no discrimination against interstate commerce, the Court analyzed 
the law in question under the Pike balancing test and relied on the 
“significant health and environmental benefits” conferred on county 
citizens from the county processing facility.35 According to the Court, the 
ordinance “conferr[ed] significant health and environmental benefits 
upon the citizens of the Counties” by not charging for many recycling 
services, thus creating incentives for recycling and responsible disposal of 
hazardous waste, and by stricter enforcement of recycling laws through 
routing all recyclables through one facility.36 
Even in instances where there has been discrimination against interstate 
commerce, the Supreme Court has, in at least one case, upheld preferences 
for in-state products on environmental, health, or safety grounds when the 
state can show no non-discriminatory means of achieving an important 
health, safety, or environmental protection interest. For instance, in 1986, in 
Maine v. Taylor,37 the Court upheld a Maine statute prohibiting imported, live 
baitfish, because of the risk of such baitfish carrying parasites not common 
to wild fish in Maine that would threaten Maine fisheries. The Court held 
that even though the statute discriminated against interstate commerce, 
Maine presented satisfactory evidence of a legitimate local interest in 
protecting its “unique and fragile fisheries” and further recognized  
that Maine lacked alternative nondiscriminatory alternatives that would 
advance that interest.38 The Court agreed with the district court that “the 
constitutional principles underlying the commerce clause cannot be read 
as requiring the State of Maine to sit idly by and wait until potentially 
irreversible environmental damage has occurred or until the scientific 
community agrees on what disease organisms are or are not dangerous 
before it acts to avoid such consequences.”39 The Court concluded that 
“[t]his is not a case of arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce; 
the record suggests that Maine has legitimate reasons, ‘apart from their 
origin, to treat [out-of-state baitfish] differently.’”40 
 
 34.  550 U.S. 330, 345 (2007). 
 35.  United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 346–47. 
 36.  Id. See also Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting) (“States may take actions legitimately directed at the preservation of the 
State’s natural resources, even if those actions incidentally work to disadvantage some 
out-of-state waste generators.”). 
 37.  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
 38.  Taylor, 477 U.S. at 140–41, 151. 
 39.  Id. at 148 (quoting U.S. v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 1984)). 
 40.  Id. at 151–52 (citing City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)). 
Notably, Justice Stevens dissented, stating that there was “something fishy about this case” 
and questioned why Maine should be allowed to facially discriminate against bait fish from 
other states when no other states had such laws and when there was significant uncertainty 
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The Court has also upheld nondiscriminatory laws enacted to promote 
public health and environmental goals even if they may burden out-of-
state industries and benefit in-state industries. For instance, in 1981, in 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery,41 the Court upheld a statute banning the 
retail sale of milk in nonreturnable, non-refillable plastic containers to 
reduce consumption of energy and waste disposal.42 In enacting the 
statute, the state legislature hoped to create a new market for recyclable 
milk containers even though it acknowledged that such a market did not 
exist at that time, and producers might need to switch, in the short term, 
to nonreturnable, non-recyclable paperboard containers while the new 
market developed.43 The Court held that the law did not discriminate against 
out-of-state interests in favor of in-state interests even though the evidence 
showed that plastic resin, the raw material used for making plastic  
nonreturnable milk jugs, was produced entirely by non-Minnesota firms 
while pulpwood, used for making paperboard milk containers, was a major 
Minnesota product and at that time, the paperboard milk containers would 
likely be the short-term substitute for the banned plastic containers.44 
Nevertheless, the Court found the law applied to in-state and out-of-
state milk producers alike and did not discriminate. Thus, the Court applied 
the Pike balancing test and upheld the law, finding that any burden on the 
out-of-state plastics industry was not clearly excessive “in light of the 
substantial state interest in promoting conservation of energy and other 
natural resources and easing solid waste disposal problems . . . .”45   
The Court concluded by stating that “[a] nondiscriminatory regulation 
serving substantial state purposes is not invalid simply because it causes 
some business to shift from a predominantly out-of-state industry to a 
predominantly in-state industry.”46 It also cited an earlier case, Exxon 
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,47 for the proposition that the Commerce 
 
about the possible ecological effects from the presence of parasites and nonnative species 
in shipments of out-of-state baitfish. Id. at 153 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 41.  449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
 42.  Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 471–72. 
 43.  Id. at 465–67. 
 44.  Id. at 472–73. 
 45.  Id. at 473. 
 46.  Id. at 474. 
 47.  437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
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Clause “protects the interstate market, not particular interstate  firms, 
from prohibitive or burdensome regulations.”48 
In recent years, lower courts have also upheld laws that may adversely 
impact out-of-state market participants and benefit in-state market 
participants so long as the law regulates evenhandedly and the state can 
point to a legitimate environmental or energy policy goal.49 For instance, 
in 2011, in American Petroleum Institute v. Cooper,50 the U.S. District 
Court for the District of North Carolina upheld a law requiring fuel 
distributors to sell both gasoline blended with ethanol (E10 or “blendstock”) 
and unblended gasoline to fuel marketers and retailers in the state. In 
enacting the law, the state wished to promote the use of ethanol by 
increasing the number of participants in the blending market and thus 
reduce dependence on foreign oil. According to the state, without the statute, 
“it would be possible for suppliers to monopolize blending of fuel, 
completely excluding local marketers from participating in the blending 
process.”51 With the state statute, local marketers had the option to blend 
fuel themselves prior to sale and take advantage of the excise tax credits 
for blending ethanol with gasoline, thus potentially increasing the number of 
ethanol blenders in the state.52 Out-of-state fuel suppliers challenged the 
law, alleging that when suppliers have the option of only selling 
blendstock, they predominantly ship blendstock on the interstate pipelines, 
which allows for reduced distribution costs and increased efficiency.53 
The plaintiffs argued that the statute prevented these efficiencies by 
requiring suppliers to ship full octane unblended fuel in addition to 
blendstock, thus requiring suppliers to ship more products. They also cited 
the potential for distribution and storage disruptions.54 
 
 48.  Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 474 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of 
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127–28 (1978)). Id. at 126 (“The fact that the burden falls on 
some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against 
interstate commerce.”). 
 49.  Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 22 (2012) (No. 10-1555); Constr. Materials Recycling 
Ass’n Issues and Educ. Fund Inc. v. Burack, 686 F.  Supp. 2d 162 (D.N.H. 2010); 
Proceeding on Motion of the Commission Regarding a Retail Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard, 235 P.U.R. 4th 414 
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 2004); Zenith/Kremer Waste Sys., Inc. v. Western Lake Superior 
Sanitary Dist., 572 N.W. 2d 300 (Minn. 1997); Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790 
(8th Cir. 1995); Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envtl. Imp. Comm’n, 307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973). 
 50.  American Petroleum Institute v. Cooper, 835 F. Supp. 2d 63 (E.D.N.C 2011), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 718 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 51.  American Petroleum Institute, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 
 52.  Id. at 73. 
 53.  Id. at 68, 87. 
 54.  Id. at 87. 
KLASS-HENLEY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:24 AM 
[VOL. 5:  127, 2013–14]  Dormant Commerce Clause 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 141 
In upholding the law, the court found that the state’s goal of promoting the 
use of blended fuel and reducing dependence on foreign oil was a rational 
state interest, that the law was a legitimate means of doing so by 
encouraging new participants in the ethanol market, and that the alleged 
burdens on interstate commerce and out-of-state producers were speculative. 
The court also concluded that the law regulated evenhandedly even 
though all of the petroleum suppliers were out-of-state. The court found 
that in-state marketers would have to weigh the risks and benefits of 
participating in the blending process and thus the burdens of the law did 
not fall only on out-of-state interests.55 Although the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit vacated in part and remanded the case to the district 
court on plaintiffs’ preemption challenge to the North Carolina law, the 
plaintiffs did not raise the Commerce Clause claim on appeal and thus the 
court of appeals did not address it.56 
Likewise, in 2010, in Construction Materials Recycling Association 
Issues and Education Fund v. Burack,57 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Hampshire upheld a New Hampshire law that banned the 
combustion of most construction and demolition (“C&D”) waste in the 
state and excluded it from the definition of biomass fuels, thus 
preventing C&D waste from participating in the biomass fuels market in 
the state.58 Although the plaintiffs, participants in the C&D disposal 
market, acknowledged the law was facially neutral because it treated 
C&D debris generated within New Hampshire and imported from out-of-
state the same, they argued that the legislation’s real purpose was 
protectionist. The plaintiffs argued that the law was intended to “benefit 
New Hampshire’s virgin wood producers in the local market for biomass 
fuel at the expense of out-of-state providers of C&D debris who wished 
to compete with virgin wood producers.”59 Plaintiffs also argued “that the 
C&D legislation has a discriminatory effect even if it was not intended to 
discriminate against out-of-state interests because it entirely foreclosed out-
of-state C&D debris sellers from competing in the New Hampshire 
biomass fuel market.”60 
 
 55.  Id. at 87–88. 
 56.  American Petroleum Institute v. Cooper, 718 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 57.  686 F. Supp. 2d 162 (D.N.H. 2010). 
 58.  Constr. Materials Recycling Ass’n Issues and Education Fund, 686 F. Supp. 2d 
at 165, 172–23. 
 59.  Id. at 167. 
 60.  Id. 
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The court applied the Pike balancing test and rejected the plaintiffs’ 
arguments.61 The court found that the law was aimed at the protection of 
public health and the environment rather than the promotion of local 
commerce.62 One of the provisions of the law amended an existing statute 
that was enacted to “protect public health, to preserve the natural 
environment, and to conserve precious and dwindling natural resources 
through the proper and integrated management of solid waste.” Another 
provision, which excluded C&D debris from the definition of biomass fuels, 
made “clear that its goal was to promote ‘local renewable fuels’ that can 
‘improv[e] air quality and public health, and mitigat[e] against the risks 
of climate change.’”63 The court found that the evidence did not support 
the plaintiffs’ arguments that the burden would fall primarily on out-of-
state firms or that in-state firms would benefit from the law. The court also 
found that there was no evidence that the law would impose an undue burden 
on interstate commerce. Instead: 
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the record at 
best suggests that an unknown number of regional producers of C & D-derived fuel 
will suffer unquantified reductions in profits if they are denied access to the New 
Hampshire biomass fuel market. A dormant Commerce Clause claim, however, 
cannot be based merely on a showing that a challenged statute will cause individual 
out-of-state businesses to lose profits. . . . This is especially true in cases such as 
the present one, where the legislation at issue is reasonably targeted at important public 
health and environmental concerns.64 
Together, these cases show that the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
acknowledged the important role of the states in developing policies to 
promote renewable energy and protect the environment. Clearly, states 
may not discriminate against out-of-state interests in pursuing such policies. 
Nevertheless, so long as the state regulates evenhandedly, the fact that 
these laws may burden specific out-of-state firms whose products no longer 
meet the new state standards or benefit specific in-state firms whose 
products do meet those standards does not in itself result in a violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause. 
B.  The Role of the Extraterritoriality Doctrine 
As noted earlier, beyond the determination of whether a state law 
discriminates against interstate commerce and is subject to strict scrutiny, or 
whether it regulates evenhandedly and is subject to the Pike balancing test, 
courts also consider separately whether a state law, even if it does not 
 
 61.  Id. at 169–73. 
 62.  Id. at 169. 
 63.  Id. at 167 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F-1 (2007)). 
 64.  Id. at 172–73. 
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discriminate, regulates activities wholly beyond state borders and thus 
violates the “extraterritoriality doctrine.” In those circumstances, courts 
generally apply strict scrutiny and strike down the state law in question as 
unconstitutional.65 
1.  The Supreme Court Price-Affirmation and Business Cases 
For instance, in 1935, in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,66 a New York 
statute set the minimum prices for milk purchased from New York 
producers and banned resale of milk purchased for less than the minimum 
price from out-of-state producers.67 Thus, in order to sell out-of-state milk 
in New York, a milk wholesaler was required to pay a particular price out-
of-state: a price dictated by New York. The Court found that the statute 
improperly set out-of-state milk prices and held the statute 
unconstitutional.68 
Likewise, in 1986, in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State 
Liquor Authority,69 the Court struck down the state’s Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Law, which prohibited distillers from selling alcohol to New York 
wholesalers at prices higher than the lowest prices they were charging 
wholesalers elsewhere in the country.70 The Court found that the effect of 
the regulation was to either force distillers to change their out-of-state 
promotions to comply with the New York statute, or to force states to 
change their regulatory standards to permit distillers to alter prices in those 
states in order to comply with the New York regulation.71 Thus, the Court 
concluded that New York had “project[ed] its legislation” into other states 
and directly regulated commerce therein in violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.72 
 
 65.  See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 453–54 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing the 
trend in Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause cases of finding discrimination more 
often where there is a greater disparate impact on out-of-state participation in an in-state 
market). 
 66.  294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
 67.  Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 519. 
 68.  Id. at 528. 
 69.  476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
 70.  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 581–82. 
 71.  Id. at 583–84. 
 72.  Id. 
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A few years later in 1989, in Healy v. Beer Institute,73 the Court struck 
down a Connecticut statute requiring out-of-state shippers of beer to 
ensure their prices in Connecticut were no higher than prices in bordering 
states. The Court followed its prior precedent, and held that the dormant 
Commerce Clause precluded “the application of a state statute to commerce 
that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the 
commerce has effects within the State.”74 The Court stated that a statute 
has extraterritorial effects when (1) it has the practical effect of regulating 
activity wholly outside the state’s borders regardless of legislative intent 
and (2) it has the potential of creating conflicts if other states were to adopt 
similar legislation.75 According to the Court, these limitations “reflect the 
Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national 
economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate 
commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their 
respective spheres.”76 
In reaching its decision in Healy, the Court relied not only on the earlier 
price-affirmation cases but also on its 1982 decision in Edgar v. Mite.77 In 
that case, the plaintiffs challenged the Illinois Business Takeover Act, 
which required any takeover offer for the shares of a target company to be 
registered with the Secretary of State.78 A “target company” was defined as a 
corporation or other issuer of securities of which shareholders located in 
Illinois own 10% of the class of equity securities subject to the offer, or for 
which any two of the following three conditions are met: the corporation has 
its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under the laws of 
Illinois, or has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus 
represented within the State.79 The Secretary of State then could call a 
hearing during a specified period if he believed it was necessary to protect 
the shareholders of the target company and could deny the offer under 
certain circumstances.80 
The Court struck down the law on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, 
finding that the law had “a sweeping extraterritorial effect” and imposed 
 
 73.  491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
 74.  Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 
(1982) (plurality opinion) (“The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation 
is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”)). 
 75.  Id. at 336–37. 
 76.  Id. at 335–36. 
 77.  457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 78.  Edgar, 457 U.S. at 626–27. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 627. 
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“a direct restraint on interstate commerce.”81 The Court found that the law 
would prevent transactions not only with the target company’s 
shareholders in Illinois (which in the present case were only a quarter of 
the shareholders), but also any transactions with other shareholders outside 
Illinois, thus interfering with interstate commerce.82 The Court also noted 
that the law would apply even if none of the shareholders were residents 
of Illinois because the law applied to any corporation with its principle 
place of business, executive officer, or 10 percent of capital in the state.83 
“Thus the Act could be applied to regulate a tender offer which would not 
affect a single Illinois shareholder.”84 
Notably, in each of the cases described above, the state’s purpose was 
to protect economic interests within the state, whether they were the 
interests of Illinois companies and investors, New York and Connecticut 
liquor retailers and consumers, or New York milk producers. Nevertheless, 
as shown below, even when states have regulated to protect public health 
and safety rather than economic interests, courts have still invoked the 
extraterritoriality principle if states impose requirements on out-of-state 
transactions or create the risk of conflicting regulations among the states 
in a way that would unduly burden interstate commerce. 
2.  The Supreme Court Transportation Cases 
The Court has conducted similar analyses in cases involving interstate 
transportation of goods on the nation’s highways and railways. For instance, 
in 1945, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, the Court invalidated an 
Arizona statute limiting train length on the grounds that compliance with 
the statute required longer trains from other states to be broken up before 
crossing Arizona’s borders.85 Under the Arizona law, the only option to 
avoid this disruption was for other states to adopt Arizona’s train length 
limits—a clear imposition of Arizona’s regulatory authority on other 
states.86 Further, the Court found the safety benefits of shorter train lengths 
 
 81.  Id. at 642. It is important to note, however, that there was no majority for the 
portion of Justice White’s opinion that contains the extraterritoriality analysis. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  325 U.S. 761, 773 (1945). 
 86.  Id. The Court in Southern Pacific Co. stated that the legislation would have the 
effect of requiring other states to either adopt the lowest train length limit of any of the 
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relative to unregulated trains to be “dubious” at best.87 “[This] case differs 
from those where a state, by regulatory measures affecting [ ] commerce, 
has removed or reduced safety hazards without substantial interference 
with the interstate movement of trains.”88 The Court also declared that 
national uniformity in the regulation of railroads was “practically 
indispensable to the operation of an efficient and economical national 
railway system.”89 
Likewise, in 1959, in Bibb v. Navajo Trucking Freight Lines, the Court 
applied similar reasoning to invalidate an Illinois statute requiring that all 
trucks use a specific type of mudguard within state borders.90 Almost 
every other state used a mudguard style different than the type required 
by the Illinois regulation. The Court thus held that “[t]his is one of those 
cases—few in number—where local safety measures that are 
nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce.”91 According to the Court, a state which imposes a design that 
conflicts with that of almost all other states “may sometimes place a great 
burden of delay and inconvenience on those interstate motor 
carriers entering or crossing its territory.” Thus, without a showing that 
the new safety standard is so compelling and innovative that other states 
should give way, such an interference with interstate commerce is too big 
a burden.92 
While the Court’s analyses in the cases described above were conducted 
pursuant to what appears to be an early version of the Pike balancing test,93 
the analysis also resembles the extraterritorial regulation cases because of 
the concerns regarding states regulating out-of-state activity. In the train 
 
states the train passes through or to break up and reconstitute interstate trains entering 
states with different restrictions on train length. Id. at 773. 
 87.  Id. at 779. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 771. 
 90.  359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
 91.  Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529. 
 92.  Id. at 529–30. 
 93.  See generally James C. Preston, Note, Constitutional Law—Commerce Clause— 
Commerce Clause Challenges to State Highway Safety Regulations Are to Be Reviewed 
under a Highly Deferential Standard, 28 VILL. L. REV. 708 (1983) (discussing the Court’s 
balancing approach to reviewing the dormant Commerce Clause challenges in state highway 
safety regulation cases); Laura L. Ritzman, Note, Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways 
Corp.: Limitations on a State’s Power to Legislate in the Area of Interstate Commerce, 
1982 DET. C.L. REV. 931, 934 (1982) (explaining the Court’s adoption in Southern Pacific 
Co. of the “balance test” weighing local benefits against the burden on “the free flow of 
interstate commerce.”); S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 
(1936) (finding state regulation of highways was a legitimate local interest similar to other 
regulations burdening both interstate and intrastate commerce that “have been sustained 
even though they materially interfere with interstate commerce.”). 
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and truck cases, the need for uniformity among the states to allow the free 
travel of goods and services along the nation’s interstate highways and 
railways seems clear and was certainly a priority for the Court at the time 
those cases were decided. In other cases, however, there may be stronger 
arguments in favor of state autonomy to protect public health, safety, and 
the environment. Indeed, commentators have suggested that such scrutiny 
of state regulation is inappropriate except in cases of clearly discriminatory 
legislation.94 They argue that “[s]tates are allowed to make their own 
regulatory judgments about scores of issues. The mere fact that states may 
promulgate different substantive regulations of the same activity cannot 
possibly be the touchstone for illegality” under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.95 Notably, companies that do business in multiple states have 
always had to comply with varying laws on a range of consumer protection, 
business regulation, public health, safety, and environmental issues and, 
unless Congress preempts those laws in favor of federal uniformity, 
principles of federalism argue in favor of state autonomy in the absence 
of discrimination against out-of-state interests or an undue burden on 
interstate commerce.96  Further, limitations on states’ power to regulate 
within their own jurisdictions may have the problematic effect of imposing 
the laws of other states on the state whose regulation was originally being 
challenged.97 
 
 94.  See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1881 (1987) (“The commercial enterprise that chooses to operate in 
more than one state must simply be prepared to conform its various local operations to 
more than one set of laws. The Constitution does not give an enterprise any special privileges 
just because it happens to operate across state lines.”). 
 95.  Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 13, at 806–07 (proposing that cases concerning 
extraterritoriality should be analyzed under the Pike balancing test to ensure that the 
“regulatory benefits were [not] illusory while the costs of complying with the local regulation 
were severe.”). 
 96.  See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 668–70 (2003) 
(finding that Maine prescription drug rebate program did not regulate extraterritorially 
because it did not regulate out of state prices, tie Maine prices to out-of-state prices, or 
attempt to subsidize in-state sales). 
 97.  Maltz, supra note 11, at 82 (critiquing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 
U.S. 520 (1959): “[T]he Court allowed a trucking company to invoke the commerce clause 
to force Illinois to accept the policies of other states on the issue of mudguards—policies 
presumably adopted without any consideration of the needs of desires of the government 
and people of Illinois. To interpret the commerce clause in a manner so fundamentally 
inconsistent with the basic concepts of state sovereignty seems totally inappropriate.”). 
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3.  Lower Court Environmental and Energy Cases Involving the 
Extraterritoriality Doctrine 
Several decisions in the lower courts have addressed in more detail this 
tension between states’ efforts to promote health, safety, and environmental 
goals and the potential for improper extraterritorial regulation. For instance, 
in 1995, in Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit upheld a Minnesota statute prohibiting all sales in the state 
of  sweeping compounds that contained petroleum products.98 The 
plaintiff argued that the law constituted extraterritorial regulation because it 
affected wholly out-of-state conduct by preventing the plaintiff from selling 
its product on the wholesale market in Minnesota where it would be resold to 
out-of-state retailers and end users. The court rejected the argument, 
stating: 
. . . a statute has extraterritorial reach when it necessarily requires out-of-state 
commerce to be conducted according to in-state terms. The statutes in Seelig and 
Brown-Forman have an extraterritorial reach not present in the Minnesota Act. 
The Act does not, either by its terms or in practical effect, necessarily affect out-
of-state commerce. The Act does not require Cotto Waxo to conduct its 
commerce according to Minnesota’s terms. Clearly, the Act has affected Cotto 
Waxo’s participation in interstate commerce. Nevertheless, the Act itself is 
indifferent to sales occurring out-of-state. Cotto Waxo is able to sell to out-of-
state purchasers regardless of Cotto Waxo’s relationship to Minnesota. We 
conclude that the Act does not suffer from an unconstitutional extraterritorial 
reach.99 
The court went on to reject the plaintiff’s argument that the court should 
still apply strict scrutiny to the statute because the law negatively 
impacted the plaintiff’s business outside of Minnesota and thus 
discriminated against interstate commerce. The court reasoned that: 
Negatively affecting interstate commerce is not the same as discriminating 
against interstate commerce. In a Commerce Clause context, “discrimination” 
means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that 
benefits the former and burdens the latter. . . . The Act does not favor in-state 
businesses or disfavor out-of-state businesses. Regardless of the product’s point 
of origin or point of destination, the Act forbids its sale in Minnesota. Therefore, the 
Act does not directly burden interstate commerce and strict scrutiny does not 
apply.100 
Applying the Pike balancing test, the court found that the law did burden 
interstate commerce, as the plaintiff had submitted uncontested evidence 
that its Minnesota distributors refused to purchase the plaintiff’s petroleum- 
 
 98.  46 F.3d 790, 794–95 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 99.  Cotto Waxo Co., 46 F.3d at 794. 
 100.  Id. 
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based sweeping compounds after passage of the law. The court also found 
the law benefitted the public. According to the legislative history, the Act 
would protect the environment by “encourag[ing] conservation by cutting 
down on non-energy uses of petroleum, and will prevent soil and water 
contamination by reducing the amount of petroleum in landfills.”101 The court 
concluded that “protecting the environment is clearly a legitimate public 
benefit.”102 Nevertheless, the court reversed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the state on grounds that the evidence supporting 
both the burden on interstate commerce and the benefits to the public was 
insufficient and required further development at trial.103 
More recently in 2010, in International Dairy Foods Association v. 
Boggs,104 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld an Ohio 
labeling law prohibiting certain statements on dairy products with regard 
to the use or nonuse of antibiotics or growth hormones. The dairy producers 
challenging the law on dormant Commerce Clause grounds argued that 
the law should be subject to strict scrutiny because it regulated 
extraterritorially.105 The plaintiffs argued that Ohio’s law required them to 
create a nationwide label that met Ohio’s requirements as a result of the 
complex distribution channels for their product and the costs associated 
with multiple labels.106 The court rejected this argument, stating: 
. . . unlike the price-affirmation statutes, which directly tied their pricing 
requirements to the prices charged by the distillers in other states, the Ohio Rule’s 
labeling requirements have no direct effect on the Processors’ out-of-state 
labeling conduct. That is to say, how the Processors label their products in Ohio 
has no bearing on how they are required to label their products in other states (or 
vice versa). Nor does compliance with the Ohio Rule raise the possibility that the 
Processors would be in violation of the regulations of another state—the key 
problem with the New York statute in Brown–Forman. The Rule accordingly 
does not purport to “regulate conduct occurring wholly outside the state.”107 
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Southern Pacific Co. 
v. Arizona,108 which invalidated the Arizona train length statute, stating 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 794 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986)). 
 103.  Id. at 795. 
 104.  622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 105.  Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 622 F.3d at 646–48. 
 106.  Id. at 647. 
 107.  Id. (citing Brown–Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573, 582 (1986)). 
 108.  325 U.S. 761, 773 (1945). 
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that unlike the Arizona statute the Ohio law does not “impede or control the 
flow of milk products across the country.”109 Unlike railroads which 
require nationwide standards, the FDA in this case had acknowledged the 
power of states to regulate the labeling of products from cows not treated 
with hormones.110 Thus, the court rejected the argument that the law 
regulated extraterritorially.111 In applying the Pike balancing test, the court 
found more than ample evidence that the state’s consumer protection goals 
outweighed any alleged impacts on interstate commerce.112 
By contrast, in 2013, in American Beverage Association v. Snyder,113 the 
Sixth Circuit reached a different conclusion with regard to a Michigan 
statute that required returnable bottles to include a state-specific mark. 
Because Michigan has a 10-cent deposit on bottles, and most states have 
no deposit and a few states have a 5-cent deposit, Michigan was losing 
money from people purchasing bottles in other states (with no deposit or 
a 5-cent deposit) and returning them in Michigan to receive the 10-cent 
deposit.114 While the bottle law encouraged recycling, the state was losing 
between $15 million and $30 million every year in Michigan deposits.115 
Thus, Michigan enacted a new law that required bottlers to use a 
Michigan-specific label for all bottles sold in the state. The label could be 
used only in Michigan or in states with a bottle deposit that had a labeling 
law similar to Michigan’s.116 Violation of the law could result in criminal 
penalties. The court held that the law did not facially discriminate against 
interstate commerce, and did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect, 
but nevertheless struck down the law on the grounds that it impermissibly 
regulated extraterritorial markets. In reaching the decision, the court noted 
that the case presented “a novel issue of an ‘unusual extraterritoriality 
question’ that has not been addressed by the Supreme Court or any other 
court.”117 
The court found that the Michigan labeling law improperly regulated 
extraterritorial conduct because the bottling industry could only sell bottles 
with the Michigan label in Michigan, and could not sell bottles with the 
Michigan label anywhere else unless those states took specific actions to 
 
 109.  Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n, 622 F.3d at 647–48. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 648. 
 112.  Id. at 649–50. Notably, in an earlier part of the decision, the court had invalidated 
certain provisions of the law on First Amendment grounds but upheld the others, which 
were then analyzed under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
 113.  735 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 114.  American Beverage Ass’n, 735 F.3d at 367. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 374–75. 
 117.  Id. at 367. 
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pass laws similar to Michigan’s law.118 As a result the court found that 
“Michigan’s unique-mark requirement not only requires beverage companies 
to package a product unique to Michigan but also allows Michigan to 
dictate where the product can be sold.”119 Applying strict scrutiny, the 
court found that Michigan had failed to explore reasonable alternatives to 
address bottle return fraud that did not regulate extraterritorially, such as 
requiring a proof of purchase receipt upon return or limiting the number of 
bottles than could be redeemed by any individual.120 
Notably, the decision was subject to two concurring opinions one of which, 
by Judge Sutton, questioned the continuing role of the extraterritoriality 
doctrine.121 Judge Sutton agreed with the result, but questioned whether the 
extraterritoriality doctrine should remain a branch of dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence at all. He reviewed the history of the dormant 
Commerce Clause and stated that its original purpose was to draw a line 
between the “separate spheres” of states and the federal government and to 
ensure that the states did not exceed their jurisdiction and regulate in areas 
reserved for the federal government.122 But as the nature of commerce 
changed, the lines between state and federal authority blurred and the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause changed. As 
Judge Sutton noted, in the 1930s and 1940s, the federal government 
established power over traditionally local activities and the states began 
to regulate commerce that would cross state lines, ending the federal 
government’s exclusive authority over interstate commerce.123 Today, we 
have “largely overlapping spheres of authority” so that “a State may fix the 
price of natural gas drilled within its borders and purchased at the 
wellhead, even when 90 percent of the gas will be shipped out of state” 
and, correspondingly, “the Federal Government may regulate local loan 
 
 118.  Id. at 376. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 375. 
 121.  Id. at 377 (Sutton, J., concurring). The other concurring opinion was written by 
Judge Rice, who agreed with the majority’s holding but wrote separately to state that: (1) 
it is the risk of potential conflict between multiple state regulations rather than actual 
conflict that rendered the law extraterritorial; and (2) once a law is found to be 
extraterritorial, it must be struck down and there is no ability for the state to justify the 
law, in contrast to the situation where a law is found to be discriminatory and the state can 
still attempt to prove the law is the only reasonable means to protect a legitimate state 
interest. Id. at 381–82 (Rice, J., concurring). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
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sharking that never crosses state lines.”124 Thus, Judge Sutton 
suggested that the extraterritoriality doctrine as “a freestanding branch of 
the dormant Commerce Clause [ ] is a relic of the old world with no useful 
role to play in the new[.]” He concluded that the purpose of the Commerce 
Clause today was not to patrol the separate spheres of government but to 
prevent discrimination against out-of-state entities in favor of in-state 
ones. And, as this case illustrated, the extraterritoriality doctrine today 
often has nothing to do with in-state favoritism.125 
Moreover, “the modern reality is that States frequently regulate activities 
that occur entirely within one State but that have effects in many.”126 
Judge Sutton gave the example of California’s strict  auto emission 
standards, which have the practical effect of impacting car companies in 
any state with lower auto emission standards (which is virtually all states) and 
thus has extraterritorial effects.127 All of the options car companies have 
available to address the discrepancy in emission standards—i.e., 
producing separate models for California, selling only California-compliant 
cars nationwide and incurring higher costs, or stop selling cars in the 
California market—impact business and commerce in other states.128 He 
also gave the example of the Ohio milk labeling law the Sixth Circuit 
upheld in 2010129 and a Vermont law that required light bulbs to come 
with labels warning of the dangers of mercury that the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld in 2001.130  In light of these changes 
in Commerce Clause doctrine, interstate markets, and the regulatory 
authority of states, Judge Sutton called for eliminating the extraterritoriality 
doctrine and limiting judicial inquiry to determining whether the law is 
per se discriminatory or, in the alternative, invalid under the Pike balancing 
test.131 
One of the more complicated recent dormant Commerce Clause cases 
involved federal maritime law, state regulation, and interstate fuel markets, 
and illustrated the modern role states have played in regulating energy 
 
 124.  Id. at 378. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 379. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 379 (citing Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 
2010)). 
 130.  Id. (citing Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 131.  Am. Beverage Ass’n, 735 F.3d at 379–80 (Sutton, J. concurring). See Note, Sixth 
Circuit Invalidates Michigan Statute Requiring Bottle Manufacturers to use Unique Mark 
on All Bottles Sold Within Michigan, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2435, 2435 (2013) (stating that 
using the Pike balancing test in place of the extraterritoriality doctrine “would ensure that 
harmful extraterritorial laws are struck down, without unnecessarily invalidating beneficial, 
unburdensome laws.”). 
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policy, climate change, and air pollution. In 2011, in Pacific Merchant 
Shipping Association v. Goldstene,132 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether California could regulate fuel-use in 
shipping vessels located more than three miles from the California coast 
in order to address significant air quality concerns in Southern California. 
Although the case involved the interplay between federal maritime law, 
state territorial boundaries, and preemption, the court also analyzed whether 
the fuel regulations were invalid under the extraterritoriality doctrine. The 
court held that the rules did not violate the extraterritoriality doctrine or 
discriminate against interstate commerce because: (1) the central purpose of 
the rules was to protect the health and well-being of California citizens; 
(2) the rules have only an incidental or indirect effect on interstate  
commerce; and (3) they do not appear to discriminate against out-of-state 
interests.133 The court concluded by stating: 
We are clearly dealing with an expansive and even possibly unprecedented state 
regulatory scheme. However, the severe environmental problems confronting 
California (especially Southern California) are themselves unusual and even 
unprecedented. Under the circumstances, we do not believe that the Commerce 
Clause or general maritime law should be used to bar a state from exercising its 
own police powers in order to combat these severe problems.134 
Thus, the court placed significant emphasis on the unique environmental 
challenges California faces, and allowed the state to impose fuel restrictions 
on vessels even though it resulted in the state regulating the shippers’ 
actions outside the state. However, the court noted that the case presented “a 
highly unusual and challenging set of circumstances” and that the regulatory 
scheme “pushes a state’s legal authority to its very limits, although the 
state ha[s] clear justifications for doing so.”135 On extraterritoriality, the 
court recognized the importance of uniformity but stated that the court 
was not confronted with a state attempting to regulate conduct in another 
state or another country.136 Instead, California’s regulation applied only to 
ships within 24 miles of the state’s coast.137 It contrasted that situation, 
however, with a hypothetical California regulation requiring automobiles 
 
 132.  639 F.3d 1154, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 22 (2012) (No. 10-
1555). 
 133.  Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1179–80. 
 134.  Id. at 1181–82. 
 135.  Id. at 1162. 
 136.  Id. at 1180. 
 137.  Id. at 1180–81. 
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driving from Arizona to switch to certain kinds of fuels 24 miles from the 
California border, implying that the result might be different in such a 
case.138 
Supreme Court and lower court holdings in the extraterritoriality cases 
demonstrate the importance of a law’s purpose and actual effect on out-
of-state transactions in the courts’ determinations of whether the law 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause. A state’s law controlling the flow of 
goods to the state from sources beyond the state’s borders may be upheld 
when the law burdens only the transactions between the state and the 
outside entity, and not the outside entity’s transactions with other states.139  
By contrast, if the law attempts to regulate sales outside of the state 
enacting the regulation, it may be struck down on extraterritoriality 
grounds.140 While states may invoke public health, safety, and 
environmental protection arguments in support of their laws, courts have 
proved unwilling to defer to states’ assertions of these legitimate local 
purposes when the law directly regulates out-of-state transactions.141 
III.  STATE ENERGY POLICY AND CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES: THE 
CALIFORNIA AND MINNESOTA EXAMPLES 
With this case law in mind, Part III turns to recent lawsuits challenging 
state efforts to use energy policy to meet climate change and environmental 
goals. While the federal government has made efforts to promote renewable 
fuels and low-carbon electricity through tax benefits, grants, and a 
renewable fuels standard, it has so far failed to enact major legislation such 
as a carbon tax, cap-and-trade framework, or a renewable energy standard as 
other countries have done to provide a more comprehensive approach to 
today’s environmental and climate change challenges.142 States, however, 
have attempted to fill this gap by enacting major energy policy legislation 
governing fuels, renewable electricity, and programs to more significantly 
promote new energy technologies.143 As of 2013, 29 states and the District of 
Columbia had enacted Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) or 
renewable energy goals.144 Generally, RPSs require that by 2020 or 2030, 
 
 138.  Id. at 1180. 
 139.  See, e.g., Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 140.  See, e.g., American Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 141.  See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
 142.  See generally E. Donald Elliott, Why the United States Does Not Have a 
Renewable Energy Policy, 43 ENVT’L LAW REPORTER 10095 (2013). 
 143.  See generally CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND CLEAN ENERGY SOLUTIONS, CLEAN 
ENERGY STANDARDS: STATE AND FEDERAL POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (2011), http:// 
www.c2es.org/publications/clean-energy-standards-state-federal-policy-options-implications. 
 144.  See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Database of State Incentives for Renewables and 
Efficiency (DSIRE), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_ 
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15%, 25%, or another set percentage of electricity sold to retail customers in 
the state must be produced by renewable energy sources, with significant 
variations on the resources that “count” and the percentages required.145 
States and local governments have also adopted feed-in tariffs to spur 
renewable energy generation (particularly rooftop solar energy), created 
mandates for renewable fuels, and placed limits on new coal-fired power 
plants.146 All of these initiatives are efforts to reduce GHG emissions and 
all of these initiatives have the effect of influencing decisions by in-state 
and out-of-state actors regarding electricity and fuel generation, transport, 
sale, and use.147 
The remainder of this Part discusses in detail California’s  LCFS 
regulation and Minnesota’s NGEA provisions that limit the use of new 
coal-fired power in the state. Both of these programs are ambitious and 
innovative in their efforts to use energy policy to meet climate change 
goals.148 Both sets of laws have also been subject to legal challenge, with the 
plaintiffs in those cases arguing that the states are discriminating against 
interstate commerce and regulating extraterritorially.149 Neither state, 
however, is alone in its efforts.150 With regard to renewable fuels, 
California has the most extensive program (discussed in more detail in 
Part III.A.) and the only one implemented so far. Oregon, though, has 
prepared formal rules for a low carbon fuel standard to reduce GHG 
 
map.pdf; Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of Environmental and 
Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 190–91 (2013) (summarizing state RPS 
policies). 
 145.  U.S. Dep’t of Energy, supra note 144; Klass, supra note 144, at 191. 
 146.  See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards 
(Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850; U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
supra note 144; infra notes 151–59 (discussing state limits on coal-fired power and 
transportation fuels). 
 147.  See e.g., Klass, supra note 144 at 191–92. 
 148.  See generally Sue Retka Schill, California LCFS to Meet 10 Percent Carbon 
Reduction Goals by 2013, BIOMASS MAGAZINE, June 2013, http://biomassmagazine.com/ 
articles/9106/california-lcfs-to-meet-10-percent-carbon-reduction-goal-by-2020; AMERICAN 
COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY IN MINNESOTA, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY IN THE STATES: MIDWESTERN REGION, 16−17 (Oct. 2013) http://www.acore.org/files/ 
pdfs/states/Minnesota.pdf. 
 149.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1087–89 
(E.D. Cal. 2011); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
2013); North Dakota v. Swanson, Civil No. 11-3232 (SRN/SER) 2012 WL 4479246, at 
*10–11 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2012). 
 150.  Renewable and Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, CENTER FOR CLIMATE 
AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/node/9340 (last visited March 26, 2014). 
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emissions from fuels by ten percent over 10 years.151 Other states have 
taken steps toward developing their own low carbon fuel standards.152 
Northeast states have joined together to develop a regional low carbon 
fuel standard, the Northeast/Mid-Atlantic Clean Fuels Standard.153 
Moreover, the U.S. government has its own renewable fuel standard (RFS), 
which imposes mandates nationwide on fuel producers to blend biofuels into 
the nation’s liquid fuel supply.154 
As for limits on new coal-fired power, starting in 2007, Minnesota 
banned new coal-fired power in the state and imports of new coal-fired 
power from out of state in the absence of CO2 emission offsets (discussed in 
more detail in Part III.B). However, Minnesota is not alone in its efforts. 
In 2006, California prohibited retail utilities in California from entering 
into long-term financial commitments with in-state and out-of-state 
electric generation sources unless they meet GHG performance standards 
established by the California PUC.155 In 2007 the State of Washington 
enacted a GHG performance standard for baseload electricity that is 
similar to California’s standard.156 Both sets of performance standards 
result in a ban on new coal-fired power in those states. In 2009, Oregon 
imposed a 1,100 pound of CO2/megawatt hour performance standard on 
facilities generating baseload electricity, and the state prohibits utilities 
from entering into long-term commitments with in-state or out-of-state 
baseload electricity providers that do not meet that standard, effectively 
banning any new commitments for coal-fired power use in the state.157 
While prior Oregon law had allowed utilities to offset new emissions by 
reducing existing emissions, the 2009 statute does not allow for offsets.158 In 
 
 151.  World Map of Regional Policies, NAT’L LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD 
PROJECT, http://nationallcfsproject.ucdavis.edu/map/#or (last visited March 28, 2014); 
SUE LANGSTON, ET. AL, FINAL REPORT, OREGON LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARDS, STATE OF 
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (2011); See Ben Jacklet, Fuel Fight 
Revs Up in Salem, SUSTAINABLE BUS. OR., (2013), available at http://sustainable 
businessoregon.com/articles/2013/02/fuel-fight-revs-up-in-sale.html?page=all. 
 152.  See, e.g., Low Carbon Fuel Standards, DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, STATE OF WASH., 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/fuelstandards.htm. 
 153.  SONIA YEH, ET. AL., NATIONAL LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD: TECHNICAL 
ANALYSIS REPORT 20 (2012) (reporting that governors of eleven Northeastern states signed a 
memorandum of understanding in 2009 to commit to developing a Clean Fuels Standard 
program). 
 154.  Renewable Fuel Standard, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http:// 
www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/. 
 155.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341 (West 1994 & Supp. 2012). 
 156.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 80.80.040 (setting standards for all baseload electric 
generation to govern utilities in the state that enter into long-term contracts). 
 157.  OR. REV. STAT. §§ 757.536(1)(a)–(b) (West 2013). 
 158.  See Dustin Till, New Oregon Climate Laws Expands Emission Performance 
Standards, GHG Reporting, and Energy Efficiency Programs, MARTEN LAW, Aug. 26, 
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New York, the Power New York Act of 2011 resulted in the New York 
Department of Environmental Conservation setting CO2 emission limits 
from new major electric generating facilities that effectively prohibit new 
coal-fired power generation in the state, but the regulations do not cover 
electricity imports.159 
Parts A and B discuss the California and Minnesota laws and the legal 
challenges that have been brought to invalidate them, with a particular 
focus on the plaintiffs’ extraterritoriality doctrine arguments. The debate 
over extraterritoriality in the context of these cases highlights the difficulty 
states face in using energy policy to meet environmental and climate 
change goals as a result of the regional, national, and international nature 
of energy markets. Indeed, it is precisely because state energy policies can 
influence regional, national, and even international fuel and electricity 
markets that they are more vulnerable to dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges. 
A.  Legal Challenges to California’s Low Carbon Fuel                          
Standard Regulation 
California’s LCFS regulation was developed as part of California’s 
Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as AB 32, which set goals to 
reduce GHG emissions in California to 1990 levels by 2020. As one of 
the mechanisms intended to meet that goal, along with provisions relating to 
renewable electricity generation and other climate change policies, the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) developed the LCFS regulation, 
 
2009 (“In a notable departure from [prior Oregon law], S.B. 101 does not contain provisions 
allowing facilities to achieve compliance through offsets. Thus, S.B. 101 effectively 
prohibits Oregon utilities from building new coal-fired power plants, extending the life of 
existing coal plants, or entering into long-term purchase agreements with coal plants 
located outside the state.”). 
 159.  See N.Y. Dept. of Env. Conserv., In the Matter of Proposed Part 251 and 
Proposed Part 487, at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/legal_protection_pdf/parts251and487 
hr.pdf; N.Y. Dept. of Env. Conserv., Press Release, DEC Adopts Ground-Breaking Power 
Sector Regulations to Analyze Possible Environmental Impacts and Limit CO2 Emissions 
from Power Plants, June 28, 2012, available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/ 83269.html; 
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, New York Proposes Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards for Power Plants, available at http://www.c2es.org/us-states-
regions/news/2012/new-york-proposes-greenhouse-gas-emission-standards-power-plants; 
Environmental Defense Fund, States Have Led the Way in Curbing Carbon Pollution from 
New Power Plants, available at http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/State_GHG_ 
standards_3-13-2012.pdf (summarizing state laws). 
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effective April 2010.160 The goal of the LCFS regulation is to lower 
emissions associated with transportation fuels, and requires oil refiners 
and distributors to lower GHG emissions by reducing the carbon intensity of 
their fuels by at least 10 percent by 2020.161 In California, transportation 
emissions are the state’s largest single source of GHG emissions, 
constituting 40% of the state’s total emissions.162 The following sections 
detail the regulations implementing the LCFS and the lawsuit alleging, 
among other things, that the California law violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
1.  California’s Legislation and its Implementation 
The LCFS regulation establishes a 2010 baseline carbon intensity (CI) 
for gasoline, fuels that replace gasoline, and fuels that replace diesel in 
California.163 The regulation then requires each supplier of vehicular 
transportation fuels to reduce the average carbon intensity of fuels from 
that baseline by set amounts annually between 2011 and 2020.164 CI is 
determined by calculating “lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions” associated 
with a “fuel pathway,” which encompasses all emissions associated with   
the fuel, from production source to destination.165 The LCFS regulation also 
allows suppliers to generate credits for exceeding the CI reduction required 
 
 160.  Notice of Approval of Regulatory Action, Cal. Office of Administrative Law 
(Apr. 15, 2010) OAL File No. 2010-0304-01 S, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
regact/2009/lcfs09/oalapplcfs.pdf. 
 161.  CAL. AIR RES. BD., ESTABLISHING NEW FUEL PATHWAYS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA 
LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD: PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR REGULATED PARTIES 
AND FUEL PROVIDERS 1 (Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/ 
122310-new-pathways-guid.pdf. 
 162.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 163.  Declaration of Michael Scheible in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction ¶ 26, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. 
Supp. 2d 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 02234). The 2010 baseline CI is based on California’s 
average consumption of gasoline and diesel fuels. 
 164.  CAL. AIR RES. BD., ESTABLISHING NEW FUEL PATHWAYS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA 
LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD: PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR REGULATED PARTIES 
AND FUEL PROVIDERS 1 (Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/122310- 
new-pathways-guid.pdf. If a fuel provider supplies a fuel that has a lower CI than the 
standard for that year, the provider accumulates a credit. If the fuel has a higher CI than 
the CI standard, the party will accumulate a deficit. 
 165.  CARB, ESTABLISHING NEW FUEL PATHWAYS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA LOW 
CARBON FUEL STANDARD: PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR REGULATED PARTIES AND 
FUEL PROVIDERS, 1 (Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/122310- 
new-pathways-guid.pdf. CI values are calculated by a standard greenhouse gas emissions 
equation (gCO2e/MJ is the unit of measurement), which provides total greenhouse gas 
emissions on a CO2 equivalent basis per unit of energy for a fuel. 
KLASS-HENLEY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:24 AM 
[VOL. 5:  127, 2013–14]  Dormant Commerce Clause 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 159 
that year, creating the opportunity for a trading market in credits among 
suppliers nationwide.166 
Traditionally, a fuel was analyzed in terms of the emissions released as 
the fuel is used, such as when natural gas is burned in a power plant or 
gasoline is combusted in a vehicle. But the California regulation uses a 
lifecycle analysis of each fuel to determine the fuel’s CI.167 A lifecycle 
analysis for carbon emissions for fuels includes both the direct and indirect 
emissions from the production, transportation, and consumption of the 
fuel in vehicles.168 Unlike California’s existing tailpipe emissions standards 
which target only the GHG emissions from fuel combustion in vehicles, 
the lifecycle GHG analysis includes both emissions from fuel combustion in 
vehicles and all GHGs emitted in connection with the fuel’s production, 
thus creating the potential for greater net GHG emissions reductions.169 
With regard to ethanol, while all ethanol emits similar amounts of CO2 
at the time of combustion, the lifecycle carbon emissions associated with 
the production of ethanol from different processes can vary substantially. 
Factors affecting emissions include the feedstock used (corn, sugar, etc.); the 
energy source used to convert the feedstock into ethanol (natural gas, 
wind, coal); how far the feedstock has to travel to production facilities; 
how far the ethanol has to travel to be used in vehicles in California; and 
the type of transportation (trucks, trains, etc.) used for those trips. As a 
result, corn grown primarily in the Midwest has only a short distance to 
travel to ethanol plants in the Midwest, which favors Midwest ethanol 
under the corn transportation metric as compared to California ethanol 
plants, which must transport the Midwestern corn a much greater distance 
before it can be made into ethanol. However, while the ethanol produced 
in the Midwest must travel a greater distance to be used in California 
 
 166.  UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD: REDUCING 
GLOBAL WARMING POLLUTION FROM CALIFORNIA’S TRANSPORTATION FUELS (Feb. 2009), 
available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_vehicles/ca-low-carbon-fuel-
standard-fact-sheet_final.pdf. If a fuel provider supplies a fuel that has a lower CI than the 
standard for that year, the provider accumulates a credit. If the fuel has a higher CI than 
the CI standard, the party will accumulate a deficit; Jonathan Rubin & Paul N. Leiby, 
Tradable Credits System Design and Cost Savings for a National Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard for Road Transport, 56 ENERGY POLICY 16–28 (2013). 
 167.  CAL. AIR RES. BD., LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD: QUESTION AND ANSWER 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (VERSION 1.0) 2 (June 10, 2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
fuels/lcfs/LCFS_Guidance_(Final_v.1.0).pdf. 
 168.  Id.; Powerpoint: Presentation to the California Air Resources Board LCFS Land 
Use Change Expert Workgroup: Carbon Emission Factors Subworkgroup (Aug. 17, 2010). 
 169.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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vehicles, the California pathway is assigned an overall higher CI value for 
transportation because transporting corn results in higher emissions than 
transporting ethanol.170 
The LCFS regulation establishes LCFS “Lookup Tables” assigning 
specific average CIs to fuels based on the amount of GHGs emitted over 
the lifecycle of the fuel. For example, according to CARB’s assessment, 
as reflected in Table 6 of the Lookup Tables, Midwest ethanol produced 
using coal for heat and electricity generates a CI over twenty percent 
higher than that of gasoline, a difference in net lifecycle emissions that 
tailpipe standards alone do not address.171 Thus, CARB’s LCFS takes into 
account all aspects of fuel production, refining, and transportation, with 
the goal of reducing total GHG emissions.172 
Table 6 in the Lookup Tables contains one set of fuel pathways, 
including different CI values for different types of fuels, separated by those 
processes that are correlated with location and those that are not correlated 
with location.173 For example, milling process and source of thermal 
energy used in the production of the fuel are not correlated with location 
and thus are individually labeled while transportation, efficiency, and 
electricity are correlated with plant location (Midwest, Brazil, or  
California).174 Emissions resulting from feedstock transportation are not 
directly proportionate to distance traveled, but rather assess total distance 
traveled, total mass and volume transported, and efficiency of the method of 
transport.175 Because California grows no corn for ethanol and its producers 
import raw corn (bulkier and heavier than refined ethanol shipped from 
Brazil and the Midwest), California ethanol produces the most 
transportation emissions while Midwest ethanol produces the least.176 
 
 170.  See Declaration of Michael Scheible in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction ¶ 45, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 
843 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 02234). 
 171.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). 
See Declaration of Michael Scheible in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction ¶ 45, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 
2d 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 02234). 
 172.  Rocky  Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1080–81. CARB then assigns a 
cumulative CI value to an individual fuel lifecycle, or “pathway.” 
 173.  Id. at 1084. In determining total CI values for each ethanol pathway, for 
example, the California model considers total CI by assessing such factors as: (1) feedstock 
growth and transportation; (2) efficiency of production; (3) electricity used to power the 
plant; (4) thermal energy fuel source; (5) milling process; (6) transportation of fuel to 
blender in California; and (7) conversion of land to agricultural use. 
 174.  Id.  at 1083. California ethanol plants are, on average, newer and use less thermal 
energy and electricity in production than plants in the Midwest, where much of the electricity 
used in production is generated by coal-fired power plants. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
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However, California’s combination of more efficient plants and greater 
access to low-carbon electricity outweighs Midwest ethanol’s lower 
transportation emissions and results in an overall lower CI value for 
California ethanol.177 
In the Lookup Tables, fuels are distinguished by different pathway 
descriptions (e.g., under ethanol from corn, “Midwest average”  and 
“California average”) and are assigned a total CI score based on a direct 
effects emissions value and an indirect effects emissions value.178 
California’s fuel market is diverse, and includes fuels from many different 
“feedstocks,” or source materials. Comparing emissions by different 
feedstocks at different stages of feedstock production, transportation, and 
use is only possible when based on the total lifecycle emissions of each 
fuel pathway.179 CARB uses the “CA-GREET”180 model, which factors in 
California’s strict environmental regulations and low-carbon electricity 
supply to model lifecycle emissions for fuels used in California.181 
Fuel providers can comply with the LCFS CI reporting requirements 
via two methods. The first is by identifying the appropriate “default 
pathway” from the default pathways schedule issued by CARB (Table 6) 
for fuels it predicted would appear in the California market.182 The default 
pathways provide average values for the CA-GREET factors for these 
fuels. Fuel providers selling fuel under a default pathway may rely on that 
pathway in reporting the CI for that fuel.183 
 
 177.  Id. at 1084. 
 178.  Low Carbon Fuel Standard 2011 Program Report, Final Draft (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/workgroups/advisorypanel/20111208_LCFS%20program 
%20review%20report_final.pdf. 
 179.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1081. 
 180.  STATE OF CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD EXPERT WORKING GROUP: LOW 
CARBON FUEL STANDARD–INDIRECT EFFECTS SUBGROUP ON INDIRECT EFFECTS OF OTHER 
FUELS 7–8, http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/workgroups/ewg/010511-final-rpt-alternative- 
modeling.pdf. The Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and  Energy Use in 
Transportation Model (GREET) was developed by Argonne National Laboratory to model 
lifecycle emissions of different fuels. The model calculates the carbon intensities of 
different fuels using both direct and indirect lifecycle emissions. The CARB approach to 
modeling such indirect effects as land use change is a variant of the GREET model, 
developed to assess lifecycle GHG emissions of corn ethanol. See also Detailed 
California-Modified GREET Pathway for Corn Ethanol, CARB (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www. 
arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/022709lcfs_cornetoh.pdf. 
 181.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1082. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
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The second method allows ethanol providers with higher-than-average 
efficiency plants to apply for individualized CI values.184 CARB recognized 
that the Lookup Tables’ pathway averages for Midwest corn ethanol may not 
be accurate for specific ethanol producers (e.g., producers who do not 
conform to the average Midwest production model envisioned by 
CARB’s model). Providers must compare their calculated CI value to the 
closest CI value in the Lookup Tables, making sure their calculated value 
is equal to or lower than the table value and corresponds to a 
substantially similar reference pathway (i.e., a provider must compare a 
calculated CI value for corn ethanol with a corn ethanol pathway in the 
table).185 If approved, the specialized fuel pathway is added to the Lookup 
Table and is available to all fuel providers.186 By applying for individual 
assessments, some Midwest plants have already obtained CI scores lower 
than California producers.187 The Midwest producers that have obtained 
individualized pathways either co-generate heat and electricity or use a 
renewable source for thermal energy.188 
At the outset of the LCFS program, commentators questioned whether 
there were sufficient fuel sources available to meet LCFS goals, and how 
fuel producers would be able to achieve the reductions the law requires.189 
Reviews of the LCFS program, however, have found sufficient appropriate 
 
 184.  See CARB, ESTABLISHING NEW FUEL PATHWAYS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA LOW 
CARBON FUEL STANDARD: PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR REGULATED PARTIES AND 
FUEL PROVIDERS (Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/122310-
new-pathways-guid.pdf; Method 2 Carbon Intensity Applications, CARB, available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/2a2b/2a-2b-apps.htm (showing applications and CARB 
approvals of applications for individualized carbon intensity pathways). 
 185.  CARB, ESTABLISHING NEW FUEL PATHWAYS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA LOW CARBON 
FUEL STANDARD: PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR REGULATED PARTIES AND FUEL PROVIDERS, 
at 5–6. In calculating the CI value, providers must factor revised fuel production, storage, and 
transport into the direct CI value. 
 186.  Id. at 1–2 (Aug. 2, 2010), at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/122310-new-
pathways-guid.pdf. 
 187.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1082; Brief of Defendant-Appellants at 
46, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 
2012); Brief for Appellees at 32, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, appeal docketed, 
Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2012); Declaration of Michael Scheible in Support 
of Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction ¶¶ 62–64; Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 02234). These include 
Midwest natural gas-fired plants that are more efficient than those described in the LCFS Table. 
One example is a Kansas ethanol plant that uses a waste wheat slurry stream from a wheat 
processing plant in its feedstock mix. 
 188.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1084. 
 189.  See generally ICF INTERNATIONAL, CALIFORNIA’S LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD: 
COMPLIANCE OUTLOOK FOR 2020 (2013), available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/ 
california2019s-low-carbon-fuel-standard-compliance-outlook-for-2020 (outlining various 
compliance scenarios that would fulfill CARB’s 2020 emission reduction goals). 
KLASS-HENLEY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:24 AM 
[VOL. 5:  127, 2013–14]  Dormant Commerce Clause 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 163 
fuels are available, and that compliance with LCFS requirements can likely 
be achieved through modest adjustments in the diversity of fuel types used 
in California.190 To date, regulated parties under the LCFS have succeeded 
in lowering the CI of California’s transportation fuels, but more low 
carbon fuel investment is still necessary to meet the program’s 2020 
goals.191 
2.  The Lawsuit 
Ethanol producers in the Midwest sued the State of California to 
invalidate and enjoin the LCFS program on grounds that it discriminates 
against interstate commerce, constitutes extraterritorial regulation of 
interstate commerce, and places undue burdens on interstate commerce 
under the Pike balancing test. In 2011, in Rocky Mountain Farmer’s 
Union v. Goldstene, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California enjoined implementation of the LCFS program, holding that it 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminates against 
out-of-state energy producers and attempts to regulate activities outside 
of California’s borders.192 
In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, the district court determined that the 
transportation component of the CI analysis—which factors in the distance a 
fuel travels from production source to California—facially discriminates 
against out-of-state ethanol producers.193 In a separate decision released 
the same day, the court also rejected CARB’s argument that specific 
provisions in the federal Clean Air Act allowing California (but no 
other states) to regulate fuels and fuel additives for motor vehicle emissions 
control should exempt the state from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.194 
 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Compare Sonia Yeh, Julie Witcover & Jeff Kessler, Status Review of California’s 
Low Carbon Fuel Standard 1 (2013) with BILL HUDSON, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES 
BOARD’S (CARB’S) LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD (LCFS): LIKELY IMPACT ON MIDWEST 
CORN ETHANOL, THE PROEXPORTER NETWORK (JUNE 10, 2009), https://www.proexporter. 
com/library/documents/99/29_PRX_CARBdetailAnal.pdf (stating that CARB’s LCFS 
compliance schedule “will prove impossible to meet” without development of commercial 
technology for cellulosic ethanol). 
 192.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1094 (E.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
 193.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1087. 
 194.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (E.D. Cal. 
2011). 
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Finding facial discrimination, the district court explained that a less 
stringent balancing test applies to legislation that regulates in-state and 
out-of-state entities equally.195 The LCFS did not satisfy this threshold 
because the regulatory standards facially discriminate against interstate 
commerce by giving California ethanol a lower CI value relative to out-
of-state sources despite the identical make-up of the fuel sources 
themselves.196 The court maintained that states may not  
‘discriminate against an article of commerce by reason of its origin or destination out 
of state . . . The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state 
or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism’ . . . In this context, 
‘discrimination simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefit the former and burdens the latter.’197  
In particular, the court focused on the fact that California penalized 
Midwestern ethanol through its CI analysis based on transportation and 
out-of-state electricity assumptions, both of which discriminate on the 
basis of location.198 
The court rejected the idea that discrimination was avoided because 
ethanol plants could submit their own specialized CI fuel pathways if their 
processes or electricity sources were less carbon intensive than the default 
tables. The court focused on the fact that approval of new fuel pathways 
was within the state agency’s discretion and, more importantly, the 
existence of the alternative pathways simply highlighted the 
discriminatory nature of the default tables. Thus, the court found that the 
law “impermissibly discriminates on its face against out-of-state entities.”199 
The district court went on to find that the regulations were subject to 
strict scrutiny for another reason: the LCFS controls extraterritorial conduct. 
Even apart from the plain language of the statute, the court found that 
“[t]he critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to 
control conduct beyond the boundaries of the state.”200 To make that 
determination, the court must consider “how the challenged statute may 
interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what 
effect would arise if not [just] one, but many or every, State adopted similar 
legislation.”201 The court found that the law regulates “deforestation in South 
America, how Midwest farmers use their land, and how ethanol plants in 
 
 195.  Id. at 1084–85. 
 196.  Id. at 1088–89. 
 197.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1085–86 (citing C & A 
Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); Oregon Waste Disposal 
Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). 
 198.  Id. at 1088–89. 
 199.  Id. at 1090. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
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the Midwest produce animal nutrients.”202 The court also noted, based on 
the plaintiffs’ briefs, that most production of corn ethanol occurs entirely 
outside of California.203 
The court rejected the state’s argument that the law’s effects merely 
influenced the market, and did not require ethanol producers to engage in 
or limit any particular activities outside the state.204 Instead, the court 
found that because the regulations provided incentives to adopt production 
measures that resulted in lower emissions, the law attempted to control 
conduct outside the state.205 The court also held that the LCFS program 
created the potential for conflict with other states’ regulations because 
ethanol producers “would be hard-pressed to satisfy the requirements of 
50 different LCFS regulations which may [require] 50 different levels of 
reduction over 50 different time periods.”206 The court further found that 
the LCFS impermissibly regulated the “channels of interstate commerce” 
because it required CARB approval of changes in the fuel’s transportation 
method (i.e., truck, rail, ship transport, or some combination) before giving 
producers CI credits.207 The court held that this forced producers to seek 
California regulatory approval before taking action in another state, thus 
causing the LCFS to “directly regulate interstate commerce.”208 
The court agreed with the state that “the LCFS serves a legitimate and 
local interest,” to reduce the risks of global warming despite the global 
nature of the problem, and cited Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the 
Supreme Court recognized states’ legitimate interest in reducing global 
warming.209 The court then turned to the question of whether California 
could achieve its goal of reducing global warming using nondiscriminatory 
alternatives, and found the state failed to establish such alternative means 
were not available.210 According to the court, other nondiscriminatory 
alternatives could include regulating only tailpipe GHG emissions in 
California, or adopting a tax on fossil fuels with the goal of reducing GHG 
 
 202.  Id. at 1090–91. 
 203.  Id. at 1090. 
 204.  Id. at 1091. 
 205.  Id. at 1091–92. 
 206.  Id. at 1092–93. 
 207.  Id. at 1092. 
 208.  Id. at 1092 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York, 406 U.S. 57, 
582 (1986)). 
 209.  Id. at 1093 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007)). 
 210.  Id. at 1093. 
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transportation emissions.211 While acknowledging that the available 
alternatives to the LCFS “may be less desirable,” the court found that 
California failed to show that no nondiscriminatory means existed.212 For 
the court, this failure to establish the law as the only way to achieve 
emissions reduction goals invalidated the regulation under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.213 The district court enjoined the regulations but the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending 
resolution of the appeal.214 
In September 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision that the LCFS facially discriminated 
against interstate commerce and violated the extraterritoriality doctrine.215 It 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the LCFS 
discriminated in purpose or effect and, if the district court determined that 
it did not, directed the district court to analyze the LCFS under the Pike 
balancing test.216 
On the issue of facial discrimination against out-of-state corn ethanol, 
the court of appeals stated first that a law is not facially discriminatory 
simply because it affects in-state and out-of-state interests unequally.217 
Instead, the question is whether California’s decision to assign different 
CI values to ethanol from different locations was based solely on origin 
or whether there was some reason apart from origin to treat them 
differently.218 The court concluded that the LCFS considers location only to 
the extent that location affects the actual GHG emissions associated with 
a default pathway.219 If that ethanol pathway imposes higher costs on 
California by virtue of its greater GHG emissions, there is a 
nondiscriminatory reason for the higher CI value.220 The court noted that 
California could not successfully promote low carbon-intensity fuels and 
decrease GHG emissions associated with those fuels if it ignored the real 
 
 211.  Id. at 1093–94. 
 212.  Id. at 1094. 
 213.  Id. at 1093 (“Once a state law is shown to discriminate against interstate 
commerce; either on its face or in practical effect,’ or to exercise extraterritorial control, 
the burden falls on the State to demonstrate both that the statute ‘serves a legitimate local 
purpose,’ and that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
means.” (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)). 
 214.  Energy Law Alert: California Permitted to Enforce Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
Pending Appeal, STOEL RIVES LLP (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.stoel.com/showalert.aspx? 
Show=9482. 
 215.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 216.  Id. at 1107. 
 217.  Id. at 1089. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. at 1089–90. 
KLASS-HENLEY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:24 AM 
[VOL. 5:  127, 2013–14]  Dormant Commerce Clause 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 167 
factors behind GHG emissions, which include transportation and source 
of electricity used to produce the ethanol.221 According to the court “the 
dormant Commerce Clause does not guarantee that ethanol producers may 
compete on the terms they find most convenient.”222 The court deferred to 
CARB’s “expert regulatory judgment” in aligning the regional ethanol 
categories as it did,223 and pointed out numerous times that ethanol producers 
could seek individualized CI determinations if the regional categories did 
not adequately reflect their emissions.224 The court ended its discussion of 
facial discrimination by declaring that its conclusion “is reinforced by the 
grave need in this context for state experimentation” to address 
increasing GHG emissions and the potentially disastrous consequences to 
California’s coastline, labor force, and lands.225 
On the issue of whether the LCFS constituted extraterritorial regulation in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, the court of appeals rejected 
the argument that the LCFS regulated transactions and activities outside 
of California.226 Instead, it found with regard to the LCFS: 
  
 
 221.  Id. at 1090. 
 222.  Id. at 1092. 
 223.  Id. at 1096. 
 224.  Id. at 1082, 1084. 
 225.  Id. at 1097. 
 226.  Id. at 1101. 
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It says nothing at all about ethanol produced, sold, and used outside California, it 
does not require other jurisdictions to adopt reciprocal standards before their 
ethanol can be sold in California, it makes no effort to ensure the price of ethanol 
is lower in California than in other states, and it imposes no civil or criminal 
penalties on non-compliant transactions completed wholly out of state.227 
The court explained that even though states may not require compliance 
with their laws in wholly out-of-state transactions, “they are free to regulate 
commerce and contracts within their boundaries with the goal of influencing 
out-of-state choices of market participants.”228 The court also rejected the 
district court’s conclusion that adoption of similar legislation by other states 
would “balkanize” the fuel market.229 It failed to find evidence that similar 
regulations in other states would make it difficult or impossible for 
ethanol producers to meet the various state requirements.230 It noted that 
a few other states were considering similar legislation but that “[i]f we 
were to invalidate regulation every time another state considered a 
complementary statute, we would destroy the states’ ability to experiment 
with regulation.”231 The court concluded its discussion by stating that 
California “should be encouraged to continue and to expand its efforts to 
find a workable solution to lower carbon emissions, or to slow their rise.”232 
Regarding the dormant Commerce Clause, it declared: 
It does not invalidate by strict scrutiny state laws or regulations that incorporate 
state boundaries for good and non-discriminatory reasons. It does not require that 
reality be ignored in lawmaking.233 
The court of appeals thus reversed the district court’s decision on facial 
discrimination and extraterritoriality and remanded for entry of partial 
summary judgment in favor of CARB on those issues. It then directed the 
district court to determine whether the ethanol provisions discriminate in 
purpose or effect and, if not, to apply the Pike balancing test.234 
The decision was subject to a dissent by Judge Murguia, who agreed 
with the district court that the simple existence of Table 6, which gives 
some California ethanol more favorable treatment than some out-of-state 
ethanol, constitutes facial discrimination.235 In other words, the majority’s 
consideration of CARB’s purpose for treating ethanol produced in different 
regions differently was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, which 
 
 227.  Id. at 1102–03. 
 228.  Id. at 1103. 
 229.  Id. at 1104–05. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. at 1107. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. at 1108 (Murguia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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instructs the court to determine whether the regulation is discriminatory 
before considering the reasons for that discrimination.236 
The ethanol producers then sought en banc review of the panel decision but 
the full Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc.237 There was a dissent from 
the rehearing denial by Judge Smith, joined by six other judges, and a 
concurrence supporting the rehearing denial by Judge Gould, who authored 
the Ninth Circuit panel decision. In his dissent, Judge Smith focused 
primarily on the following points: (1) precedent requires that a state law be 
found facially discriminatory if there is any differential treatment between in-
state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and 
burdens the latter, regardless of whether there is a legitimate reason for the 
differential treatment; (2) the regulations seek to control conduct in other 
states because they penalize out-of-state practices and land use decisions 
associated with the production of ethanol; and (3) the regulations threaten to 
“balkanize” the national economy.238 
In his concurring opinion supporting the denial of rehearing en banc, 
Judge Gould made several points: (1) California is free to regulate 
commerce within its borders even if the regulations have an ancillary goal 
of influencing the choices of actors in other states; (2) some states are 
already joining California in its innovative efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions from fuels, countering the argument that California is 
“balkanizing” the national economy; (3) the district court may still find 
the law discriminates in purpose or practical effect and is subject to strict 
scrutiny even though the law does not facially discriminate; (4) a 
geographic distinction that affects in-state and out-of-state interests 
differently is not facially discriminatory so long as there is a reason apart 
from origin to treat those interests differently; (5) the LCFS’s provisions 
are based on carbon emissions and not for the purpose of benefitting local 
companies at the expense of foreign companies; and (6) California’s efforts, 
while incremental to start, could lead to broader action by other states and/
or the federal government which supports the idea of states as 
“laboratories of democracy.”239 
  
 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014) (denial of 
en banc review). 
 238.  Id. at 512–17 (Smith, J. dissenting). 
 239.  Id. at 509–12 (Gould, J., concurring). 
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B.  Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act and Ban on                           
New Coal-Fired Electricity 
Moving from the West Coast to the Midwest, the State of Minnesota is 
also attempting to reduce air emissions and combat climate change but in 
this case through restrictions on coal-fired power plants rather than on 
transportation fuels. The sections that follow discuss the Minnesota 
NGEA with particular focus on its restrictions on power generated from 
new coal-fired power plants. It explains the law itself, the impact on 
Minnesota’s neighbor, North Dakota, and the lawsuit North Dakota has 
filed against Minnesota raising preemption and dormant Commerce Clause 
claims. 
1.  The Minnesota Legislation and its Implementation 
In 2007, Minnesota enacted the NGEA, which includes provisions that 
(1) require utilities to generate a certain percentage of electricity for retail 
sale from renewable energy sources, (2) promote energy conservation, and 
(3) attempt to address climate change by limiting GHG emissions.240 The 
goal of the statute is to “reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions across 
all sectors producing those emissions to a level at least 15 percent below 
2005 levels by 2015, to a level at least 30 percent below 2005 levels by 2025, 
and to a level at least 80 percent below 2005 levels by 2050.”241 With 
regard to coal-fired power, the statute provides that after August 1, 2009, no 
person shall (1) construct a new large energy facility within the state, (2) 
import power from a new large energy facility built outside the state, or 
(3) enter into a long-term power purchase agreement that would contribute 
to statewide power sector CO2 emissions unless there is a corresponding 
offset of CO2 emissions.242 Because of the size of the facilities covered and 
the exception for natural gas-fired power facilities, the law applies most 
directly to coal-fired power plants in Minnesota built after 2007 as well as 
post-2007 coal-fired power plants outside Minnesota that wish to import 
power to Minnesota.243 
  
 
 240.  Next Generation Energy Act of 2007, ch. 136-S.F. No. 145, 1, https://www.revisor. 
mn.gov/data/revisor/slaws/2007/0/136.pdf. 
 241.  MINN. STAT. § 216H.02, subd. 1. 
 242.  MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 3 and 4. 
 243.  See MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subd. 1 (defining “new large energy facility”); 
Chris Heineman et al., Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act: Why Dismantle a Program 
that Works? MINNPOST (2011), http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2011/03/ 
minnesotas-next-generation-energy-act-why-dismantle-program-works. 
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2.  North Dakota’s Role in Minnesota Electricity Markets and the 
Lawsuit Challenging the NGEA 
Minnesota imports one-third of its electricity and over one-half of those 
imports come from Manitoba Hydro.244 For the two-thirds of electricity 
generated from Minnesota power plants, over 50 percent of that in-state 
generation uses coal, most of which is imported from Wyoming and 
Montana.245 Despite this current reliance on coal, the state is moving away 
from coal, as demonstrated by federal government statistics showing that 
Minnesota’s reliance on coal dropped from approximately 66 to 53 
percent from 2000 to 2010.246 North Dakota is home to eight coal-fired 
power plants, including some owned by Minnesota utilities. These plants 
burn North Dakota’s lignite coal deposits.247 Most North Dakota power 
generation is exported to Minnesota.248 
In 2011, the State of North Dakota, North Dakota lignite coal companies, 
and certain electric cooperatives with members in multiple Midwestern 
states sued to invalidate the NGEA. Among other claims, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the NGEA violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it 
discriminates against out-of-state interests, imposes an excessive burden on 
interstate commerce, and regulates extraterritorially.249 The plaintiffs also 
 
 244.  Riordan Frost, Energy in Minnesota: The Carbon Conflict, MINNESOTA 2020 
(Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.mn2020.org/issues-that-matter/economic-development/energy-
in-minnesota-the-carbon-conflict (coal imported from out of state comes primarily from 
Montana and Wyoming). 
 245.  See EIA, Minnesota Profile Overview, July 2012, http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid= 
MN#tabs-4; U.S. Dept. of Energy, Clean Energy in My State: Minnesota Electricity 
Generation, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/electricity_generation.cfm/state=MN; MRES 
Joins North Dakota Suit Against Minnesota Over Its Energy Policy, Missouri River Energy 
Services, MISSOURI RIVER ENERGY SERVICES (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.mrenergy.com/ 
uploads/files/MRES_Today_11-28-11.pdf. 
 246.  EIA, supra note 245 (reporting that 53% of electricity generated in Minnesota 
came from coal-fired electric power plants in 2011 and that Minnesota ranked fourth in 
the nation in net electricity generated from wind energy that year); Frank Jossi, Do 
Minnesota Coal Curbs Overstep Authority? FINANCE & COMMERCE, July 17, 2012, 
available at http://finance-commerce.com/2012/07/do-minnesota-coal-curbs-overstep-authority/. 
 247.  David Shaffer, N.D. Can Press on with Lawsuit Over Coal Generated Electricity, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 1, 2012, available at http://www.startribune.com/business/ 
172134481.html. 
 248.  Jossi, supra note 246. 
 249.  Complaint at 27–29, 34–35, North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 0:11-cv-03232 (D. 
Minn. 2011). 
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alleged that the NGEA is preempted by the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the 
Federal Power Act (FPA).250 
In September 2013, the parties brought cross motions for summary 
judgment on the preemption claims and the dormant Commerce Clause 
claims.251 On the issue of extraterritoriality, the plaintiffs argued that the 
NGEA does not prohibit goods that are themselves inherently different or 
dangerous, distinguishing Maine v. Taylor.252 According to the plaintiffs, 
once generated, “electricity is electricity and there is no difference in the 
electrons based on how they came into existence.”253 They argued that 
because the NGEA’s prohibition focuses on the manufacture of electrons 
rather than the quality of the goods themselves, Minnesota is regulating 
electricity generation that occurs wholly in other states in violation of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine.254 Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that the 
offset exemption for electricity generated out-of-state further illustrates the 
extraterritorial reach of the statute because it forces a generator or importer 
to seek regulatory approval in advance before importing electricity that 
would contribute to the state’s power sector carbon emissions.255 This, in 
turn, “forc[es] a merchant to seek regulatory approval  in one state 
before undertaking a transaction in another,” in violation of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine based on Brown-Forman Distillers Corp.256 
Plaintiffs also cited Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona and Bibb v. Navajo 
Freight Lines in support of their arguments that the extraterritoriality 
doctrine invalidates the NGEA separate and apart from the traditional 
framework used for dormant Commerce Clause challenges based on 
discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect.257  
In their own summary judgment motion, the defendants addressed the 
extraterritoriality doctrine by arguing that the NGEA regulates only in-state 
 
 250.  Complaint at 30, 31-34, 36-37, North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 0:11-cv-03232 
(D. Minn. Nov. 2, 2011). 
 251.  Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, North Dakota v. Swanson, Docket 
No. 0:11-cv-03232 (D. Minn., filed Nov. 2, 2011), filed Sept. 5, 2013; Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment, North Dakota v. Swanson, Docket No. 0:11-cv-03232 (D. Minn., 
filed Nov. 2, 2011), filed Sept. 5, 2013. 
 252.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 25, North Dakota v. Swanson, Docket No. 0:11-cv-03232 (D. Minn., filed Nov. 2, 
2011), filed Sept. 5, 2013. 
 253.  Id. at 25. 
 254.  Id. at 25–26. 
 255.  Id. at 26. 
 256.  Id. at 26; See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 
476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986). 
 257.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
28−29, North Dakota v. Swanson, Docket No. 0:11-cv-03232 (D. Minn., filed Nov. 2, 2011), 
filed Sept. 5, 2013. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. 
v. State of Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
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entities and in-state activities and imposes no direct limitations on 
commerce occurring entirely outside of Minnesota.258 According to the 
defendants, out-of-state utilities can continue emitting carbon from 
electricity generation; they must only comply with the NGEA when they 
choose to import that electricity into Minnesota.259 
In April 2014, the district court granted in part the plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment.260 It declined to rule on the plaintiff’s preemption 
claims261 and also did not reach the claims that the NGEA discriminated 
against interstate commerce.262 Instead, the court found that the NGEA 
regulated extraterritorially and violated the dormant Commerce Clause on 
that basis.263 In reaching that decision, the court focused on the 
provisions of the NGEA stating that (1) “no person shall” import power 
from a new large energy facility that would contribute to statewide power 
sector carbon dioxide emissions without offsets and (2) “no person shall” 
enter into a new long-term power purchase agreement that would increase 
power sector carbon dioxide emissions without offset.264 
The court rejected arguments by Minnesota and by the environmental 
group amici that it should decline to rule on the plaintiffs’ claims on 
grounds of standing, ripeness, and abstention.265 Minnesota argued that 
the plaintiffs could not point to any injury they had sustained or any long-
term power purchase agreements they had refrained from entering into 
because of the NGEA and that any claim that their business operations were 
inhibited by the law were speculative.266 The environmental group amici 
argued that the court should abstain from deciding the case until the 
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission and Minnesota courts 
determined the reach of the law, in particular whether it applies broadly 
to all electricity transactions within the Mid-Continent Independent System 
Operator (MISO) or more narrowly to cover only direct transactions with 
 
 258.  Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 
21, North Dakota v. Swanson, Docket No. 0:11-cv-03232 (D. Minn., filed Nov. 2, 2011), filed 
Sept. 5, 2013. 
 259.  Id. at 21. 
 260.  North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 1612331 
(D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014). 
 261.  Id. at *13. 
 262.  Id. at *16. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. at *3. 
 265.  Id. at *11–12. 
 266.  Id. at *10. 
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Minnesota entities.267 In rejecting these arguments, the court pointed to 
instances where the Minnesota Department of Commerce had stated that 
the NGEA would potentially apply to electric cooperatives with members in 
multiple states that intended to sell power on the MISO market, on grounds 
that some of that electricity bid into the MISO market could make its way 
into Minnesota.268 Although Minnesota subsequently declined to apply the 
NGEA to these types of transactions, the court found the threat of such a 
broad application of the law to these types of transactions adversely impacted 
the business dealings of the electric cooperative plaintiffs, which was 
sufficient to confer standing on the plaintiffs and render the case ripe for 
review and inappropriate for abstention.269 
On the merits, the court refused to adopt the state’s narrow interpretation 
of the NGEA, which would limit the “no person shall” language to persons 
located or operating in Minnesota.270 Instead, it read the language broadly to 
impose no knowledge requirement or locational requirement, which meant 
that that the law would cover any power sold into the MISO market from 
any location and ultimately dispatched by MISO to any location, since 
there is no way to track or monitor the path of specific electrons once they 
enter the MISO grid.271 Because such a reading of the law would control 
market transactions where the buyers and sellers were both outside of 
Minnesota and require them to obtain Minnesota approval for the out-of-
state transaction, the court concluded that the law has an extraterritorial 
reach.272 Specifically, the court stated that: 
  
 
 267.  Id. at *12. MISO is a federally-approved, independent, non-profit organization 
known as a “regional transmission organization” or “RTO.” RTOs coordinate and monitor the 
transmission of electricity within a multi-state region. Id. at *1–2. Today, most of the 
country except for the Southeast and Intermountain West is part of an RTO or a similar 
organization, known as an Independent System Operator (“ISO”). See About 60% of the 
U.S. Electric Supply is Managed by RTOs, TODAY IN ENERGY (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www. 
eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=790. MISO operates and controls the electric 
transmission grid in parts of 10 states in the Midwestern and southern United States, 
including in North Dakota, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. MISO monitors electricity supply 
and demand within its region and operates energy and capacity markets within that region, 
including day-ahead and hourly transmission markets to match supply and demand. See About 
Us, MIDCONTINENT INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, https://www.misoenergy.org/AboutUs/ 
Pages/AboutUs.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2014). See also North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 
11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 1612331 at *1–2 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014). 
 268.  North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 1612331 
at *5, 12, 22 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014). 
 269.  Id. at *11–12. 
 270.  Id. at *14. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. at *22. 
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[T]he transmission of electricity over the MISO grid does not recognize state 
boundaries. Therefore, when a non-Minnesota entity injects electricity into the 
grid to satisfy its obligations to a non-Minnesota member [of a multi-state electric 
cooperative], it cannot ensure that the electricity will not travel to and be removed 
in—in other words, be imported to and contribute to statewide power sector carbon 
dioxide emissions in—Minnesota. . . . Likewise, non-Minnesota entities that 
enter into long-term power purchase agreements for capacity to satisfy their non-
Minnesota load cannot ensure that the electricity, when bid into the MISO market 
and dispatched, will not travel to and be removed in—in other words, increase 
statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions in—Minnesota.273 
The court relied on the “boundary-less nature of the electricity grid” to 
distinguish the Cotto-Waxo Co.,274 National Electric Manufacturers Ass’n,275 
and Rocky Mountain Farmers Union276 cases which involved “tangible 
products (sweeping compounds, light bulbs, and ethanol, respectively) that 
could be shipped directly from point A to point B.”277 
IV.  MOVING FORWARD: STATE ENERGY POLICY, INTERSTATE ENERGY 
MARKETS, AND THE QUESTION OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
The California LCFS case and the Minnesota NGEA case raise important 
questions about the role of states in promoting clean energy and addressing 
climate change in the face of Congressional inaction. As noted earlier, 
both the California and Minnesota cases involve preemption challenges to 
the states’ laws in addition to dormant Commerce Clause challenges. The 
final result of these preemption challenges, like the dormant Commerce 
Clause challenges, remains to be seen as the cases work their way through 
the courts. Similar lawsuits beyond the scope of this article involve dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges to state renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) 
that express preferences for renewable electricity generated within the 
state over renewable electricity generated outside the state.278 All of these 
 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 275.  Nat’l Elec. Mfr. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 276.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 277.  North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 1612331, 
at *23 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014). 
 278.  See, e.g., Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(stating in dicta that Michigan’s RPS, which preferences in-state renewable resources over 
out-of-state renewable resources, discriminates against out-of-state renewable energy in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause); Steven Ferry, Threading the Constitutional 
Needle with Care: The Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable 
Power, 7 TEX. J. OF OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 59 (2012) (discussing which state RPSs contain 
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cases raise important federalism questions regarding the extent to which 
states can create policies to address climate change and protect the 
environment without running afoul of federal laws granting regulatory 
authority to federal agencies like FERC (the preemption issues) or judicial 
doctrines limiting state interference with or discrimination against interstate 
commerce (the dormant Commerce Clause issues). 
Focusing on the dormant Commerce Clause challenges exclusively for 
present purposes, however, raises the fundamental question of how the 
California and Minnesota state energy policy cases detailed above fit within 
the existing dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Particularly with 
regard to extraterritoriality concerns, the question is whether the states’ 
goals in promoting clean energy and attempting to address climate change 
should distinguish these cases from the bulk of authority in this area. 
As any first-year student of constitutional law knows, different categories 
of dormant Commerce Clause cases tell different stories about the law. 
There are the milk cases, such as Dean Milk Company279 and West Lynn 
Creamery280 where the Court’s focus was on eliminating state and local 
efforts to protect local milk producers from out of state competition. There 
are the waste import cases such as Oregon Waste Systems281 and 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey282 where the Court prevented states from 
isolating themselves from the national waste disposal market by banning 
disposal of out-of-state waste or charging higher fees for such disposal. 
There are also the waste export cases such as C&A Carbone283 and Fort 
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill284 where states attempted to ban the export of 
waste in order to promote in-state disposal markets at the expense of out-
of-state waste disposal competitors, thus following the pattern of the 
earlier milk cases. In each of these waste cases, the court was concerned 
about the economic protection of in-state waste facilities or states walling 
themselves off from the waste disposal problem.285 Moving on to the coal 
 
preferences for in-state renewable resources and the dormant Commerce Clause threats to 
such laws). 
 279.  Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
 280.  W. Lynn Creamery Co. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (coupling a tax on milk sold 
in the state with a subsidy for in-state milk production funded by the tax discriminates 
based on the geography of production). 
 281.  Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994). 
 282.  City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 283.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
 284.  Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t. of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 
353, 354–55 (1992). 
 285.  Id. at 353–54. But see United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (where the state itself chose to promote recycling by 
establishing its own facility and requiring all waste within its jurisdiction to be processed 
KLASS-HENLEY(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/6/2016  8:24 AM 
[VOL. 5:  127, 2013–14]  Dormant Commerce Clause 
  SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 177 
cases, the state laws in Illinois and Indiana attempting to protect in-state 
coal facilities and prevent utilities from purchasing cleaner burning coal 
from outside the state in order to meet new, national air pollution regulations 
met a similar fate.286 
All these cases are examples where the evidence established that the 
primary motivation of the state law was to protect the business and 
economic interests of local firms and individuals at the expense of out-of-
state interests. Even where the state alleged it was regulating to protect public 
health and the environment, like in the waste cases, the court focused on 
the fact that the waste from any particular state was identical and thus, on 
its own, presented no additional harm to public health or the environment. 
Then there are the extraterritoriality cases. In some of these cases, 
particularly the price affirmation cases, the Court’s holding and reasoning in 
each case do not seem particularly relevant to the California and Minnesota 
disputes.  In Baldwin,287 Brown-Forman,288 and Healy,289 the intent of the 
laws in question was to protect in-state industries and consumers, and 
required the plaintiffs to take particular business-related actions in other 
states in order to comply with the target state’s law. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has not yet decided an extraterritoriality case involving environmental 
protection or energy policy. But the lower courts have, and their analyses are 
instructive. In the Ohio milk labeling case, International Dairy Foods,290 it 
was important to the Sixth Circuit that the state’s goal was to protect 
public health and that producers could use the Ohio label in other states if 
they wished. By contrast, in the Michigan case, American Beverage 
Association,291 while the ultimate goal of the state recycling program was 
to reduce solid waste and thus protect the environment, the label required 
on bottles in Michigan could not be used in any other state, thus placing 
burdens on companies engaged in interstate beverage sales. Still, though, 
the focus of the case was primarily economic, in that the reason the state 
passed the new law was because it was losing money on its bottle deposit 
program. In the California vessel fuel case, Pacific Merchant Shipping 
 
there, the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause allows the state 
to promote that policy). 
 286.  See Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995); Alliance for 
Clean Coal v. Bayh, 72 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 287.  Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
 288.  Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
 289.  Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
 290.  Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 291.  Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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Association,292 the Ninth Circuit focused heavily on California’s severe 
air emissions problems, and found that the state did not discriminate 
against interstate commerce and also did not regulate extraterritorially 
even though the rules required vessels to make business decisions regarding 
fuel before the vessel entered California waters. Thus, the court applied 
the Pike balancing test, and found that California’s interests in preventing the 
harmful effects of air pollution resulting from fuel used in vessels within 
24 miles of the state’s coast outweighed any federal uniformity interests 
or impacts on interstate commerce.293 
The courts in the California LCFS case and the Minnesota NGEA case 
have considered this body of case law, as will the other courts around the 
country reviewing state RPSs and other state laws attempting to prevent 
air pollution and address climate change by influencing consumer and 
business decisions on fuel, electricity, and other energy use. As noted 
earlier, courts and commentators have at times struggled with how to fit 
the extraterritoriality cases into the traditional dormant Commerce Clause 
framework that otherwise applies strict scrutiny to facially discriminatory 
state laws, and the more deferential Pike balancing test to laws that regulate 
evenhandedly. The Supreme Court’s extraterritoriality cases make clear 
that “the Commerce Clause dictates that no State may force an out-of-state 
merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a 
transaction in another.”294  On the other hand, the Court has often upheld 
state laws that disadvantage out-of-state firms or industries, or result in 
companies being required to comply with different regulatory standards 
in different states.295 Indeed, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes 
 
 292.  Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 293.  Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1179–18. See also Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.2d 104, 108–12 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a Vermont law 
requiring light bulb manufacturers to label mercury-containing products and packaging 
with information to inform consumers that the light bulbs contain mercury which must be 
recycled or disposed of as hazardous waste did not regulate extraterritorially because the 
law only applied to light bulbs sold in Vermont, did not require any action with regard to 
sales in other states, and plaintiffs could pass any increased labeling costs on to Vermont 
consumers if they wished). 
 294.  Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 337. 
 295.  United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
345 (2007) (“We hold that the County’s flow control ordinances, which treat in-state 
private business interests exactly the same as out-of-state ones, do not ‘discriminate 
against interstate commerce’ for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause.”); Am. 
Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 438 (2005) (“An interstate 
firm with local outlets normally expects to pay local fees that are uniformly assessed upon 
all those who engage in local business, interstate and domestic firms alike.”); Maine v. 
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (“The evidence in this case amply supports the 
District Court’s findings that Maine’s ban on the importation of live baitfish serves legitimate 
local purposes that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory 
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have stated that “[m]ultistate firms often face [costs keeping up with 
multiple regulatory regimes] with respect to varying state tax laws, libel 
laws, securities requirements . . . and much more.”296 They also point out 
that the costs and benefits of regulation can vary geographically, such as 
the problems associated with air emissions from automobiles in the Los 
Angeles area.297 Goldsmith and Sykes also note that regulated harms often 
cross state boundaries and that state regulations are routinely upheld (and 
should be upheld) despite adverse impacts on actors outside the 
jurisdiction.298 They conclude that “out-of-state costs of state regulations 
of cross-border externalities are commonplace and often desirable” and 
that “the appropriate question about these state regulations is not whether 
they produce out-of-state costs, but rather whether they are properly 
calibrated to redress local harms.”299 
In the California LCFS case, the issue becomes whether a law that 
considers distance traveled as a component in regulating a product is a per 
se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court in the 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union case found that it was,300 and Dean Milk 
v. Madison,301 which the district court cited, would on the surface seem to 
support that conclusion.302 But the Ninth Circuit in that same case found it 
is highly relevant that the reason the California law contains a transportation 
component in determining the CI value of fuels is to protect the environment 
rather than to protect specific firms in California. There is no question that 
transportation and production of fuel and fuel stocks have a significant, 
adverse environmental impact on air pollution and GHG emissions. These 
environmental and public health concerns were not at issue in Dean Milk, 
 
alternatives.”); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981) (“Even 
granting that the out-of-state plastics industry is burdened relatively more heavily than the 
Minnesota pulpwood industry, we find that this burden is not ‘clearly excessive’ in light 
of the substantial state interest in promoting conservation of energy and other natural 
resources and easing solid waste disposal problems, which we have already reviewed in 
the context of equal protection analysis.”). 
 296.  Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 13, at 793–94. 
 297.  Id. at 796. 
 298.  Id. at 796, 802–03 (“The fact that a state regulation of cross-border harms has 
an impact on out-of-state actors cannot by itself by the touchstone for illegality under the 
extraterritorial-regulation strand of analysis.). 
 299.  Id. at 827. 
 300.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1087–89 
(E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d, 730 F.3d 1070. 
 301.  Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
 302.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. 
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where the Court rejected the city’s argument that the ordinance was 
intended to protect public health.303 Instead, the Court found that the main 
purpose of the ordinance was to create “an economic barrier protecting a 
major local industry against competition” arising outside the state.304  By 
contrast, in the LCFS case, the Ninth Circuit found that California 
had legitimate public health and environmental justifications for including 
location in the CI score.305 
Further, in the California LCFS case, the district court focused on the 
fact that the law attempts to regulate “deforestation in South America, how 
Midwest farmers use their land, and how ethanol plants in the Midwest 
produce animal nutrients.”306  If fuel producers wish to sell their product in 
California, they may feel pressure to make changes in their practices 
regarding land use, electricity use, and ethanol plant efficiency in other states. 
But those producers have the choice not to sell fuels in the California market 
and they need not seek approval from California before selling their 
products in other states. The fact that California law encourages increased 
energy efficient behavior by transportation fuel producers in other states 
who wish to participate in the California market is no different in principle 
from the hundreds of different health, safety, and appliance efficiency laws 
that influence companies selling cleaning products, soaps, light bulbs, 
appliances, and other products in interstate markets.307  
If Congress wishes to create more uniformity regarding a particular 
product or standard, it may do so by preempting state law, as it has done 
with auto emission regulation (with the exception for California),308 pesticide 
labeling,309 and efficiency standards for appliances.310 But in the absence of 
federal preemption, it is unclear why any principle in dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence should act as a bar to state innovation in energy and 
environmental protection policy in the absence of evidence of the state 
attempting to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state economic 
interests. Indeed, this was one of Judge Gould’s central points in his 
 
 303.  Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354–56 (rejecting argument that ordinance was 
necessary to protect public health and noting that the state health department did not testify that 
the geographic limitation in the ordinance was necessary to protect public health). 
 304.  Id. at 354–55. 
 305.  See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 306.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1090–91. 
 307.  See supra Part II.A (discussing cases). 
 308.  See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7543(a)–7543(b) (2010) (preempting states from setting 
auto emission standards with the exception of California, which can apply to EPA for a 
preemption waiver). 
 309.  See 7 U.S.C.A. § 136v(b) (2011) (preempting state requirements for labeling or 
packaging of pesticides). 
 310.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6297 (2010) (preempting state requirements for appliances 
where U.S. Dept. of Energy has already set a federal standard for that appliance). 
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concurrence to the Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in the Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union case.311 
The Minnesota NGEA case raises similar issues regarding the extent to 
which the state can regulate energy sales and purchases within the state that 
will necessarily impact out-of-state actors participating in regional and 
national energy markets like MISO. Electricity, like fuel, is an interstate 
market and state regulation influences decisions and imposes restrictions 
that affect market actors in other states. This, however, should not be the 
test of whether the law is constitutional, particularly if the law imposes 
the same restrictions on intrastate electricity generators and out-of-state 
electricity generators. While North Dakota has a coal industry and Minnesota 
does not, Minnesota firms have significant coal-fired electricity generation 
assets, and thus are equally impacted by the law. 
Moreover, simply because a state does not have the targeted resource 
(in this case, coal) does not mean that attempting to reduce the use of that 
resource for environmental reasons is per se discriminatory in the absence of 
evidence of economic protectionist motives. Notably, in addition to not 
having a coal industry, Minnesota does not have a natural gas industry or 
a uranium industry, and has far fewer wind resources than North Dakota. 
Yet those are the resources that will be favored under the NGEA for 
environmental reasons, not economic protectionist reasons. Thus, whether 
or not the state has the targeted resource (coal in the case of Minnesota and 
corn in the case of California) cannot be the determining factor in a dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis.312 
Some will argue that electricity is different—that electrons are fungible 
and cannot be tracked in the electricity grid. Thus, state policies that 
preference certain electricity resources over others interfere with regional and 
national transmission systems to an extent not present in markets for other 
products, even fuels, where the regulated product is more easily identified, 
tracked, and separated. That certainly was a primary focus of the district 
court’s decision in the Minnesota NGEA case. While the  
transportation of electricity is indeed different than the transportation of 
other types of goods, that need not be a meaningful distinction for dormant 
 
 311.  See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 
2014) (Gould, J., concurring) (“Just as a journey of 1,000 miles begins with a single step, 
so too must legislative action to fight global warming start somewhere. Further, once states 
appreciate the benefits of the LCFS, there may be a cascade of similar laws throughout the 
country—and perhaps federal action—aimed at stemming the tide of global warming.”). 
 312.  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981). 
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Commerce Clause purposes. So long as states restrict their policies to in-
state sales of electricity, utilities and other electricity providers can enter 
into contracts for the appropriate generation mix, just like fuel providers 
in California can enter into contracts for the appropriate fuel mix, and 
retailers of a myriad of other consumer products, such as milk, waste, light 
bulbs, and chemicals can make purchasing decisions based on state policies. 
These state policies will in most cases have positive economic effects on 
some out-of-state industries that wish to participate in state energy markets 
and negative economic effects on others. But the extraterritoriality doctrine 
should not invalidate the state’s energy policy decisions even if it results 
in adverse economic impacts on some out-of-state actors so long as the 
state law does not attempt to regulate wholly out-of-state transactions.313 
Although the district court in the Minnesota NGEA case read the statute 
broadly to reach any electricity transactions within the MISO region, such 
a reading does not appear to be required by the language of the statute itself, 
as argued by the State of Minnesota and the environmental group amici.314  
Regulating purchases of electricity between in-state utilities and out-of-state 
electricity producers for in-state retail sale is not the same as regulating the 
interstate electricity grid itself, even though the electricity that is the subject 
of those purchases flows through the grid. To hold otherwise is akin to 
holding that regulating sales of fuel that flow through interstate pipelines or 
sales of other products that use interstate highways also regulate 
extraterritorially because actors may have to change or monitor their products 
when transporting them across interstate lines. Such a holding would seem to 
go far beyond the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Finally, this is not an area where Congress has preempted state law. 
While Congress has granted FERC exclusive authority over wholesale 
electricity sales and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce, states 
have significant authority over fuel mix issues and retail sales of 
electricity. If courts attempt to eliminate this authority through the 
extraterritoriality doctrine, they improperly override the balance Congress 
has set between federal and state authority in this area. While states may 
not discriminate against interstate commerce even if Congress is silent, 
relying too heavily on the extraterritoriality doctrine here runs the risk of 
interfering with valid state laws meant to address significant public health and 
 
 313.  See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1104 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (states are “free to regulate commerce and contracts within their boundaries 
with the goal of influencing out-of-state choices of market participants”); Cotto Waxo Co. 
v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 314.  Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary  
Judgment at 21, North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 0:11-cv-03232 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2013). 
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environmental concerns, and that do not discriminate against out-of-state 
interests in favor of in-state interests.315 
Other commentators have raised these same concerns regarding 
developments in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the context 
of energy policy. According to Professor Daniel Farber, electricity 
regulation is an area where “[c]ourts need to give states some space to make 
reasonable choices, realizing that in a national electric grid, every state action 
is going to have repercussions outside its borders and someone will always 
feel mistreated somewhere.”316  Should the dormant Commerce Clause 
prohibit these “repercussions” through the extraterritoriality doctrine? 
The case law detailed in Part II appears to draw a real distinction between 
policies that influence decision-making actors in other states that 
participate in interstate markets and policies that directly regulate 
activities that occur wholly in other states. While that line is not always clear, 
without evidence of facial or purposeful discrimination against out-of-state 
interests, both the California and Minnesota laws appear to fall on the 
“influence” side of the line rather than the “out-of-state regulation” side of 
the line. In the absence of a stated need for national uniformity like that 
expressed in the early train and truck cases, state energy innovation , 
particularly in the face of limited federal action, should be encouraged. 
Judge Sutton raised these same issues in his concurring opinion in 
American Beverage Association v. Snyder.317  He concluded that the 
extraterritoriality doctrine has outlived its purpose now that we no longer 
have easily identifiable and completely separate spheres of state and federal 
regulation, particularly in the environmental and energy policy realm.318 
In light of these concerns, using the extraterritoriality doctrine to police 
state energy policy in the absence of discrimination seems misplaced in 
 
 315.  For a discussion of dormant Commerce Clause challenges to RPSs and other 
state energy policy initiatives, see Lee & Duane, supra note 3. 
 316.  Daniel A. Farber, Regulators Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The 
Extraterritorial Dilemma, Legal-Planet.org (June 24, 2013), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/ 
2013/06/24/regulators-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-the-extraterritorial-dilemma/. See 
also Daniel A. Farber, Climate Policy and the United States System of Divided Power: Dealing 
with Carbon Leakage and Regulatory Linkage, 3 TRANSNATIONAL ENVTL. L. 31, 43 (2014) 
(“In a unified national market, any important state regulation is likely to have some 
spillover effects on other markets. Rather than forming a basis for a per se rule, it would be 
better to consider these out-of-state effects on out-of-state markets as simply part of the Pike 
balancing test.”). 
 317.  American Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 377 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J. 
concurring). 
 318.  Id. at 378. 
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our modern world of interconnected and interstate energy flows, where 
states and the federal government both have significant regulatory authority. 
This argues for declining to extend the application of the extraterritoriality 
doctrine to these types of environmental and energy policy cases, eliminating 
it entirely, as suggested by Judge Sutton, or otherwise limiting its scope 
significantly. Courts could justify declining to extend the extraterritoriality 
doctrine on the grounds that traditional discrimination analysis under 
the dormant Commerce Clause and federal preemption doctrine are, 
together, a sufficient check on states that might otherwise overreach on 
exercising regulatory authority to the detriment of interstate markets and 
other states.319 Moreover, even if courts did not eliminate the 
extraterritoriality doctrine entirely, they could decline to apply it when a 
range of factors exist that tend to show that state energy policy or other state 
policy that impacts interstate markets does not run afoul of the principles 
behind the dormant Commerce Clause. These factors, many of which are 
also highly relevant to the dormant Commerce Clause discrimination 
analysis, could include: (1) the presence or absence of a motivation to 
protect local businesses and economic interests; (2) the nature of the 
regulatory justification for the state law and its weight as compared to the 
need for federal uniformity; (3) whether out-of-state costs are properly 
calibrated to redress local harms; and (4) the absence of federal preemption. 
As noted earlier, federal preemption doctrine limits state action that 
conflicts with federal authority, and the dormant Commerce Clause 
addresses discrimination against out-of-state economic interests in favor 
of in-state economic interests. To also create a central role  for the 
extraterritoriality doctrine as a separate and distinct barrier under the 
dormant Commerce Clause seems misguided, particularly in the context 
of energy policy where the states have always played a central role and 
where many state efforts today are to address environmental protection 
goals rather than to promote in-state industries or in-state economic 
interests. The current spate of lawsuits over state energy policy is an 
opportunity for courts to rethink the role of the extraterritoriality doctrine 
and eliminate or at least significantly limit its application in light of the 
significant role states play and have always played in state energy policy. 
 
 319.  See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669–70 (2003) 
(declining to extend extraterritoriality analysis of price affirmation cases to Maine 
prescription drug rebate program); id. at 674–75 (Scalia J., concurring) (rejecting use of 
dormant Commerce Clause to invalidate legislation except for facially discriminatory 
legislation on grounds that it has no support in the text of the Constitution). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article explores the role of the extraterritoriality doctrine in dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the context of state laws attempting to 
reduce GHG emissions. Despite the continuing confusion surrounding the 
role of the doctrine, the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeal that 
have relied on the doctrine have, for the most part, invalidated laws that 
regulate commercial activities in other states in order to protect the 
economic interests of the target state’s businesses or consumers. Where 
the state’s goals are clearly to protect public health or the environment, 
the appellate courts have generally allowed the state law to stand. Such 
results appear consistent with the goal of the dormant Commerce Clause— 
to prevent economic discrimination against out of state interests—and focus 
on the local benefits and the burdens on interstate commerce. All state 
regulation influences decisions made by market actors in other states who 
wish to participate in interstate markets. This is particularly true when it 
comes to fuels, electricity, and other energy resources connected by 
interstate electric grids and fuel supply chains. However, the mere fact 
that an interstate market exists for a product should not limit the ability of 
states to enact policy measures to protect public health and the environment 
even it influences decisions of market actors in other states. That does not 
appear to be the role of the dormant Commerce Clause in general or the 
extraterritoriality doctrine in particular. This tension between “regulating” 
out of state conduct and “influencing” out of state conduct is highlighted 
in the California LCFS case and the Minnesota NGEA case. Both cases 
illustrate state efforts to reduce GHG emissions through regulating sales 
of energy to in-state consumers—a traditional subject of state regulation. 
The fact that these sales are part of interstate markets for fuels and 
electricity does not necessarily mean the regulations implicate the 
extraterritoriality doctrine. Instead, a more nuanced approach that considers 
discrimination, local benefits, and actual impacts on interstate commerce 
is more consistent with federalism principles and the goals of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
